1771 



ISSUE one: the evolution of international technology 



The issue that emerged from this study was whether the United 

 States should adopt a poHcy that capitahzed on its admitted lead in 

 high technology, or whether policy should be addressed instead to 

 strengthening the science and technology base of older and long- 

 established industries. One advocate of the second policy pointed 

 out that the share of the U.S. auto industry of the world market had 

 declined from more than 75 percent in 1950 to 34 percent in 1970. 



If it is true that U.S. leadership in high technology exports is eroding, 

 despite very large investments in this category, then the implication 

 appears to be that only progressively larger investments are required to 

 restore this leadership. In view of the rapid international movement of 

 high technology, it is easier and much less costly to add minor im- 

 provements for commercial purposes after the initial high technology 

 breakthrough has been achieved, than to carry a program all the way 

 from laboratory to commercial sales. For example, the great scientific 

 advances in solid state devices by the United States were quickly 

 followed by the marketing in the United States of efficient and well- 

 built Japanese pocket radios at low cost. 



Here the distinction between low and high technology is drawn as 

 follows : 



The commercially oriented [i.e. "low technology"] part of [the U.S.] technologi- 

 cal structure achieves high levels of mass production at low cost, based on high 

 levels of productivity of its labor. There is also a "high technology" part of this 

 structure (specifically, the aerospace and military systems industry) which 

 is characterized by low production of items of high quality and performance; 

 workers in this industry include a high proportion of scientific and technological 

 professionals, skilled in solving complex ana difficult problems.'"* 



To illustrate the range of diplomatic-technological issues in the con- 

 temporary world the study selected for brief analysis four technological 

 areas: atomic weapons and delivery systems, space developments, 

 agriculture, and technological infrastructure. From these it generalized 

 four trends : 



. . . (1) the important ways in which evolving technologies add to the prob- 

 lems and issues confronting the diplomat, (2) the ways in which technology tends 

 to draw nations together in international enterprises, (3) the emergence of many 

 positive values and serious dangers of technology that are of concern to many 

 nations, and (4) the need generated by technology for explicit governmental 

 plans and programs to ensure that its consequences over the globe are compatible 

 with U.S. foreign policy. <•* 



Six diplomatic effects of that part of high technology devoted to 

 nuclear arms were suggested : 



... (1) Unlimited general war is an impractical and irrational enterprise and 

 is not regarded as a realistic alternative to diplomatic agreement as was pre- 

 atomic warfare; (2) possession of nuclear arms and delivery systems is essential 

 to preservation of the mutual deterrent posture of the two superpowers and 

 pursuit of nuclear technology is essential in maintaining the balance of terror, a 

 form of stability; (3) deployment of new weapons is a competitive activity in 

 which both sides lose, which inhibits beneficial diplomatic processes, and which 

 obstructs efforts toward agreement in the control of arms; (4) technological 

 developments by either party are of intense interest to the other; (5) the dangers 

 in this relationship are so evident that formal means of direct communication 

 have been judged necessary to reduce the possibility of a triggering misunder- 

 standing of intentions ; and (6) the condition of world peace, once only a preferable 

 alternative, has become a paramount and imperative goal of diplomacy."^ 



<'< Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, Vol. II, pp. 623-624. 

 «s Ibid., p. 627. 

 <'6 Ibid., p. 63.-?. 



96-243 O - 77 - 18 



