1779 



the time is ripe. Lasting gains for diplomacy from high technology 

 are few and uncertain. Developed countries see such achievements as 

 a challenge to be met, and the developing nations of the Third World 

 see them as arrogant demonstrations of "conspicuous consumption." 

 On the other hand, the implications of low technology for diplomac}'' 

 are likely to be in the long run of much more significance. Low tech- 

 nology meets the needs of the developing countries. It pays the taxes 

 that support the costly ventures into high technology. It provides 

 the essential base of all industry, and earns the bulk of foreign exchange 

 through its exports. In short, it determines the economic health, 

 employment, and solvency of the nation. Technological strength and 

 adequate scientific support in this category would seem to be of con- 

 tinuing relevance for U.S. foreign policy goals and as such a matter of 

 enduring concern for the Department of State. It is not evident, 

 however, that the Department's organizational scheme provides the 

 kind of analysis in depth needed as the basis for departmental positions 

 (and governmental leadership) influencing national policy favorable 

 to low technolo23^. 



Secondary International Aspects oi U.S. High and Low Technology 

 Germane to this discussion of high and low technology and their 

 diplomatic significance is a series of studies, hearings, and symposia 

 by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1963-72, 

 addressing the subject of "Science, Technolog}", and the Econom3^" 

 An interim report in February 1972 by tliis title summarized the 

 findings at that time.*^* The principal message of the report was the 

 expression of concern as to whether the concentration of U.S. research 

 and development under Government sponsorship had drained talent 

 away from low technology (i.e., the basic staple industries) to achieve 

 the prodigious accomplishments in high technology (i.e., military and 

 aerospace industries). There appeared to be a substantial consensus 

 that technical innovation was the key to productivity, and some 

 witnesses saw a "close reliance of trade, national and international, 

 upon S. & T. development." However, one witness suggested that large 

 defense and aerospace R. & D. outlays had "inadvertently" diverted 

 engineering education from the civilian economy. This asserted diver- 

 sion of talent appeared to apply generally, with low-technology in- 

 dustries less favored than high technology and its specialized, tech- 

 nically skilled people. 



It was pointed out in the report that Government sponsorship of 

 high technolog}^ involved, first, the outlay for extensive applied science 

 and technological development and, second, purchase of the product. 

 Low-technology industries were less favored in both respects. A British 

 analyst distinguished technological progress from scientific research; 

 technological advances contributed 3.2 percent of a 4.7 percent rate 

 in economic growth. He questioned the evidence as to whether 

 scientific research (as contrasted with technological development) 

 had any direct or measurable favorable impact on industrial pro- 

 ductivity. Other witnesses suggested that basic research, while still 

 an important component to technological development, had been 

 oversold. Nor was it the sole source of innovation. A summar}- of the 

 conclusion, offered by the committee staff, suggested that to improve 



*2BU.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee on Sci- 

 ence. Research, and Development. Science, Technology, and the Economy, interim report. 

 Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, 40 p. (92nd Cong., 2d sess.) 



