1791 



The hj^potheses derived from a review of the treatment of the 12 

 topics can be expressed in the form of a chain of logic that runs as 

 follows: 



1. Science and technology are a large part of the substance of 

 diplomacy. 



2. The cases and issues dealing with the technological part of 

 the science-technology spectrum have the heaviest consequences 

 for diplomacy. 



3. Technology, more than science, is strongly oriented toward 

 the private sphere, toward commercial and profit-making 

 activities. 



4. Therefore, the Department of State, in seeking to advance 

 diplomatic goals in the modern technological world, must address 

 questions of technology, and in particular must undertake to 

 exert influence for diplomatic purposes on the management of 

 technology at home and abroad by profit-seeking private enter- 

 prise. 



5. For this purpose a close functional relationship between the 

 Department and private industry needs to be established. 



Evidence in support of this set of hypotheses is drawn from the 12 

 individual chapters of the study. While clearly qualitative and 

 indicative rather than conclusive, the evidence suggests that further 

 investigation is warranted: both as to the validity of the hypotheses 

 and as to the actions required if they are confirmed. Selected observa- 

 tions from the chapters bearing on this matter are presented in the 

 following subsections. 



CASE one: the baruch plan 



Perhaps the most salient point to be drawn from this case is one 

 that received little if any attention at the time it was first made, and 

 has gone virtualh^ unremarked ever since. It concerns the matter of 

 inspection of atomic plants as to compliance with nuclear treat}^ 

 provisions. Great stress was placed on the importance of placing 

 inspectors in the Soviet Union, and it was even suggested by one U.S. 

 leader that such inspection might be one way "to alter Russia's closed 

 society." *^^ 



On the other hand, the Board of Consultants who assisted in the 

 preparation of the initial U.S. policy report on the international 

 control of atomic energy warned that the presence of a large number 

 of foreign inspectors would be "as obnoxious to Americans as to any 

 others." ^^^ The truth of this cautionary observation is evident when 

 one considers the probable reaction of any large American industrial 

 corporation engaged in the production of nuclear hardware — pacific 

 or otherwdse — when confronted with an asserted right of entry of a 

 foreign national to inspect the premises and examine the books. 

 The unqualified insistence of some bodies of U.S. opinion on the 

 necessity for inspection of Soviet territory in connection with the 

 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty*^' raises interesting questions as 

 to the attitude of U.S. industry toward any such proposed provision. 



«9 Wu, The Baruch Plan, Vol. I, p. 86. 



«o Ibid. p. 81. 



«' See for example, U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Re.search Service. Technical Information for 

 Congress, a report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science 

 and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Ofl., pp. 195, 204-205, 

 and 216. 



