1815 



To this end the Secretary of State proposed the creation of an 

 International Industrialization Institute and an International Center 

 for the Exchange of Technological Information; the planning of a 

 conference on science and technology for development; agreement on 

 standards of conduct for both governments and transnational enter- 

 prises (multinational corporations) vdth respect to the operations of 

 the latter; adjustments in the relationship of the developing countries 

 to the world trading system; establishment of a consumer-producer 

 forum for every key commodity; and a "major new international 

 effort to expand raw material resources in developing countries. 

 The United States proposes," he added, "that 1976 be dedicated as 

 a year of review and reform of the entire U.N. development system." 



Along with these concrete proposals Secretar}?" Kissinger made a 

 plea for international consensus and cooperation. He described the 

 world of 1975 as one of "some 150 nations ... in an environment of 

 continuing conflicts, proliferating weapons, new ideological divisions, 

 and economic rivalry." Then he went on to say: 



We profoundly believe that neither the poor nor the rich nations can achieve 

 their purposes in isolation. Neither can extort them from the other — the developing 

 countries least of all. . . . The reality is that the world economy is a single global 

 system of trade and monetary relations on which hinges the development of all 

 our economies. 



But it would seem that a more immediate realit}'' in the area of 

 global economic cooperation and development is the pressing need for 

 constructive and sustained leadership in the United Nations. The 

 concrete proposals by Secretary Kissinger move in that direction; 

 it remains to be seen how seriously the U.S. Government will follow 

 through. A first step might be to strengthen the U.S. Government's 

 own institutional arrangements and mobilize its own resources for 

 supporting his proposals. 



CULTURAL OBSTACLES TO INTERDEPENDENCE 



Cultural and psychological factors may greatly reinforce political 

 nationalism. American isolationism in the 19th century was sup- 

 ported by an outlook shaped largely by the open frontier and the 

 seeming limitlessness of natural resources: "The nation became a 

 great farmer-mechanic democracy, its people possessing . . . qualities 

 of independence, ambition, and individualism quite novel in the history 

 of the world." *^^ Independence was an important motivating force 

 in the life and growth of the young nation. Its role in interdependence 

 among the nations of the world, on the other hand, was almost 

 neghgible before World War I, and did not become a matter of com- 

 mitment until after World War II. Another major example of insistent 

 independence and self-reliance is that of the Chinese Communists 

 during the past three decades. 



Successful North Vietnamese resistance to a series of external 

 threats over a long period was founded on more than political and 

 ideological nationalism or skill in tactics of guerrilla warfare. Although 



"5 Wa\nie Caldwpll Neely. The Agricultural Fair. (Columbia L niversity Studies in tho History of Ameri- 

 Cfln Agriculture; edited by Uarry J. Carman and Rexford C. Tugwell.) New York, Columbia University 

 Press, 1035, p. 72. 



