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Lessons from the Six Cases in the Study for Short- and Long-Range 

 Planning 

 The diplomatic consequences of the six cases examined in the 

 course of the study of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 

 ranged from less than optimal to neariy disastrous. In most of the 

 cases, the evidence suggests that a more thorough and extended 

 study of the subject might have led to a more favorable outcome. 



' CASE one: the baruch plan 



The postwar effort of the United States to achieve by diplomatic 

 means the international control of atomic energy stands as a classic 

 example of the need for long-range, coherent planning of the interface 

 of science and technology with diplomacy. 



One aspect of the situation was the rate and timing of postwar 

 demobilization of U.S. troops in Europe. 



Another aspect was how long the wartime alliance of the Soviet 

 Union with the United States and Britain would persist after the 

 war ended in Europe. 



A third question of timing involved the level of Soviet competence 

 in nuclear technology — how long an interval there would be before 

 the U.S.S.R. possessed atomic weapons. 



Against these three time frames was the problem of the multi- 

 lateral negotiations toward a generally beneficial and acceptable 

 system of international control. 



In retrospect it appears that the timing of demobilization was not 

 recognized as a factor and that the wartime alliance disintegrated 

 much faster than had been expected, while the technical competence 

 of the Soviets in nuclear science was underestimated by a factor of five. 



The critical factor seems to have been the length of time during 

 which the United States could maintain nuclear supremacy, as some- 

 thing to bargain with. The bargain needed to be concluded during the 

 period of U.S. supremacy, with the United States in the end clearly 

 yielding up its strategic advantage for global benefit rather than wield- 

 ing force to compel acceptance of a preferential U.S. position. This 

 requirement set the time allowance for negotiation. The time allowance 

 to plan for the negotiation was the interval between the first disclo- 

 sure to the diplomatic planners that the nuclear capability existed and 

 the earliest point at which international negotiations could be^in. 

 Since the information about the bomb for reasons of security was with- 

 held from the planners until August 1945, the negotiations were 

 delayed for 2 years until a U.S. position could be developed. More- 

 over, the planners in tKe Department of State were denied essential 

 or accurate information even during these 2 years. Meanwhile, 

 it was being asserted by General Groves, in charge of the Manhattan 

 Project, that the Soviet Union would be unable to duplicate the work 

 in 20 years. And during the first 2 postwar years demobilization took 

 place as rapidly as possible, with preference given to those longest in 

 service and most experienced. (No effort was made to persuade troops 

 with long service records to reenlist.) 



The passage of power from President Roosevelt to President Truman 

 in the spring of 1945 meant that a new and inexperienced leader was 

 serving as "Chief Diplomat." Confronted with an enormous array of 

 decisions, he could not possibly allocate adequate time to questions of 



