1875 



Before the Department of State can become an effective center of 

 long-range policy planning, he writes, radical changes are necessary: 

 the Nation's intellectual resources must be mobilized for a multi- 

 disciplinar}^ effort to redefine foreign policy and its objectives. 



As an interim measure, a truly long-range Office of Long-Range 

 Foreign Policy Planning could be established. The office should be 

 authorized to assign contract tasks to the academic community; such 

 tasks should be deliberately long-term in focus and cross-disciplinary 

 in scope. Instead of exposing Foreign Service generalists in-house to a 

 modicum of technological expertise, Robinson proposes (a) to in- 

 corporate science offerings into the curricula of academic programs 

 that prepare nascent diplomats, or perhaps (b) the seconding of 

 Department personnel (presumably generalists) for a 3^ear of con- 

 centrated academic study in a specially designed curriculum that 

 exposes them functionally to the physical and social sciences as tools 

 of diplomacy. (Robinson favors the first of the two options.) 



Another bridge between Government and the academic community 

 might be the use of a wider range of qualified scholars as informal 

 consultants and reviewers of "think pieces" prepared within the 

 bureaucracy. 



Another possibility might be for the Department of State to experi- 

 ment with a "Rand-style" affiliate entirely its own. As Robinson puts 

 it: 



This group would ordinarily report to the Policy Planning Staff, nourishing it 

 with proposals, data, and ideas as requested, thereby deepening the pressure on 

 the Stafif itself to resist disruptive clamors (or operational manpower. As I construe 

 it, the optimum would be to entrust a portion of the tasks "farmed out" to pro- 

 fessionals in the academic sphere and another portion to the newly created "Long- 

 Range Foreign Policy Planning Corporation," initially allotting the two some 

 identical assignments. 



Robinson suggests that one valuable direction of inquiry might be 

 to investigate "what selected foreign ministries do by way of encourag- 

 ing 'broad-gauge thinking' in the devisal of foreign policies." ("Are 

 they ahead of us, or behind us? In either event, what are the implica- 

 tions for the United States? What germane structural arrangements 

 exist, or are noticeably absent, overseas?") Is it possible that collabo- 

 rative studies might be launched with other States into these matters, 

 as for example through the Organization of Economic Cooperation 

 and Development? 



Another need is for "Long-Term Forecasting." As he says, "To 

 predict, to project into the future with a decent confidence is, coinci- 

 dentally, to be able to act on the international stage with more pre- 

 dictability." Accordingly, he proposes that: 



With the Office of Long-Range Foreign Policy Planning, there might be a unit 

 devoted exclusively to Long-Term Forecasting. It would not engage in any plan- 

 ning as such. ... its functions would be divided between research and the projec- 

 tion and interpretation of trends in international affaire and identification of their 

 causes. 



As Robinson points out, the pace of technological change in the world 

 is so swift that there is a temptation to be defeatist about the ability to 

 look forward. However, a policy of drift and retrospection, in the last 

 analysis, needs to assume that all technological change is beneficial 

 and that technology cann t be subject to intelligent social direction. 



