1876 



Thus he concludes: "the pubhc interest is what is at stake, rather than 

 the unrestrained prowess of technology." And to relate technology to 

 the public interest in the diplomatic sphere "mandates a long time 

 span of analysis" : 



The indirect consequences of progressions in science and technology abso- 

 lutely do not lend themselves to valid forecasts by way of a cramped temporal 

 framework. I concede [Robinson continues] the dangers and difficulties of employing 

 more-expansive time-scales and the readier manageability of data when a time- 

 scale is slender in scope. I cannot, however, concede that a constricted time-scale 

 can comprehend much more than the d^ect consequences of science and tech- 

 nology — certainly not their still-more-portentous long-range import. Short-term 

 policy analysis too often ends up in vassalage to the regnant hour, artificially 

 elongated beyond a reasonable sway. (His emphasis.) 



Robinson criticizes the present study for relying too much on what 

 has been popularly termed "The Estabhshment." He proposes that 

 "traditional" sources of policy studies be augmented by a "rotating 

 group of short-tenure professionals recruited from the 'non-Washing- 

 ton' world," drawn principally "from the intellectually supple, younger 

 elements" who would provide "provocative argumentation as well as 

 fresh approaches and perspectives, and would return to the private 

 sector before they became either stale or institutionalized." (The 

 Committee on International Relations, he adds, might with benefit 

 entertain the idea of incorporating such intellectual gadflies into its 

 own staff.) 



An interesting challenge to the Department of State is the analyst's 

 proposal that it "assess and maintain unremitting scrutiny of the 

 activities of multinational corporations from the standpoint of the 

 diplomatic ramifications of their activities." Such a focused planning 

 activity, apart from its utility in diplomacy, would have educational 

 value in opening up the world of international technology transfer and 

 its subject matter to Foreign Service generalists. (While in Professor 

 Robinson's view the multinational corporation is now more a threat 

 than a benefit to ordered intercourse among nations, it is also possible 

 that cooperative relationships and diplomatic guidance might cast this 

 expanding institution in a more constructive and beneficial role.) 



Another important subject for plarming, in Robinson's view, is the 

 "meaning and scope of the term National Security." A valuable 

 service would be the provision by statute of a definition of the criteria 

 of national security to "thwart its fiaunthig for devious and improper 

 purposes." 



With respect to the congressional role in long-range foreign policy 

 planning, Professor Robinson endorses strongly the creation of a 

 separate entity for this purpose. Ai:id he further suggests that such 

 a staff institution for the Congress: 



. . . Should help to redress the balance between the Congress and the Executive, 

 goad the Department of State to a higher level of performance by inspiring it to 

 strengthen its own policy-preparing mechanisms, and enable Members of the 

 Congress to inform and educate their constituents more confidently than can be 

 expected today. On the personnel side, it seems desirable that staff affiliation be 

 sufficiently enticing so that, while there is generous hospitality to newcomers 

 from time to time, there is constancy at the core. 



The Murphy Commission's Design for Foreign Policy Planning 



Specifications for reform in "planning for foreign policy" were 

 presented to the President and Congress in a report, June 27, 1975, by 

 the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the 



