1880 



Some Further Comments on Executive Branch Planning 



Throughout the series on Science, Technology, and American 

 Diplomacy the need has been evident for deeper and more sustained 

 study of the larger canvas of foreign policy: the global context, U.S. 

 goals and priorities, future projections, the testing of assumptions, 

 the planning of constructive initiatives, and achievement of con- 

 sistency in present-day operations with well-charted courses for the 

 future. These appear to have been the concerns also of the Murphy 

 Commission. 



However, it is possible that in its effort to be realistic in handling 

 the dilemma of short- versus long-range planning, the Commission 

 did not meet the issue head on. It ultimately opted for a Policy 

 Planning Staff that combined the two time scales. Another alternative 

 that warrants consideration is that proposed by Professor Robinson: 

 the creation of a dual Planning Staff, one short-term unit and a 

 separate (and well-insulated!) long-term unit. And an early item of 

 business of such a staff would be the study of the significance of time 

 spans in policy planning. How far into the future should long-range 

 planners try to look? How short a time frame is it safe for operational 

 planners to be constricted by? How do the broader analyses of long- 

 range planning become useful guidance for operational personnel, 

 short-term planners, and the decisionmakers in the White House, 

 the Secretary of State and his immediate associates. Members of the 

 Cabinet, and the National Security Council? Also, how might the 

 penetrating analyses of the Policy Planning Staff — both halves of it, 

 as Professor Robinson has suggested — become useful guidance for the 

 Congress? And finally, what in-house staff organization does the Con- 

 gress possess against which to play the findings of the Policy Planning 

 Staff of the Department of State? 



The Murphy Commission's proposal that a Global Systems Critical 

 List be prepared by the National Academy of Sciences is a creative 

 addition to the literature of foreign policy planning. However, dif- 

 ficulties with its implementation can be foreseen. At least a part of the 

 information input required for such a list would need to be highly 

 classified data from intelligence sources. The assembling of the list 

 would need to be an iterative process, with items tabulated, organized 

 into groups, and then reexamined as to priorities of attention based 

 on futher information. If the seabed should be an item, for example, 

 its scope would need to be determined, and then experts would be 

 recruited for the NAS panel to cover the requisite scope, drawing oh 

 intelligence as well as unclassified sources for further infonnation. 

 The required succession of security clearances would virtually ensure 

 that the list was obsolete before it has been completed and analyzed 

 for priorities. Indeed, it would be interesting to consider how such an 

 arrangement could be accommodated within the Academy framework 

 and various requirements for "freedom of information" imposed on 

 consultative groups to the Federal Government. 



An alternative possibility was offered in a bill reported from the 

 House Committee on Science and Technology, October 29, 1975.^^° 



This bill was unanimously reported by the committee with admin- 

 istration support.*** A clean bill was introduced October 20 as H.R. 



MO The National Science and Technology Policy and Organization Act of 1975, Report No. 94-595, 94th 

 Cong., 1st sess. Initial sponsors were Olin E. Teague and Charles A. Mosher, Chairman and Ranking 

 Minority Member, respectively, of the Science and Technology Committee. 



M> By letter of October 8, President Ford declared the bill "acceptable and I wiU support it if your com- 

 mittee and the full House approve it essentially as it now stands." 



