1900 



to declare war requires continuous participation in decisions 

 short of war; 



— A recognition that massive investment of U.S. resources in 

 particular initiatives of foreign policy (grain sales, for example) 

 can affect the domestic economy and well-being ; 



— A recognition that global "interdependence" links the well- 

 being of the domestic U.S. economy to foreign nations in many 

 ways: dependence of U.S. industry on foreign minerals, depend- 

 ence of U.S. consumers on imported petroleum, dependence of 

 U.S. industries on foreign markets, the rise of a new attitude of 

 global sharing of resources, and the evolution of a global system 

 of money, credit, and trade ; 



— A recognition that major industrial corporations affecting the 

 U.S. economy and employment are essentially international in 

 scope and control ; and 



— A recognition that traditional reliance on the Presidential de- 

 cisionmaking role in foreign policy initiatives tends to present the 

 Congress with fails accomplis such that legislative support be- 

 comes virtually obligatory; to be a full participant in these initia- 

 tives the Congress must be a party to their planning. 

 Since the bulk of recent U.S. initiatives or reactive measures of 

 foreign policy have tended to involve technology, the factors cited 

 above are particularly germane to a study of the congressional role in 

 science, technology, and American diplomacy. It seems evident that 

 the onrush of technology requires that the Congress be systematically 

 supplied with factual information about the world scene, with an in- 

 house capability for the analysis of this information, with its own ex- 

 perts in policy planning, and with information about results of pro- 

 grams for its own analysts to assess as a part of the oversight process. 

 Presidential assurance of consultation on new initiatives before the}'^ 

 are taken would be a logical further element. 



NEED FOR STRENGTHENED INFORMATION SUPPLY 



An oft-repeated assertion among political scientists is that foreign 

 policymaking is inherently an executive function and that the legisla- 

 tive role cannot be other than secondary because the executive brancli 

 has exclusive possession of the vast flow of information from abroad. 

 U.S. Embassies originate a flood of information cables and reports 

 concerning events and trends in other countries. Mission agencies 

 with offices or representatives abroad collect and publish statistics 

 on mihtary and naval force, agriculture, mining, health, education, 

 and other topics. Intelligence — information from all sources that has 

 been analyzed and evaluated — is a formidable (and closeh* held) 

 resource. The .systematic collection of detailed factual information is 

 partl}^ routine, partly in comment on significant new developments, 

 and partly in response to inquiries from the home office. Taken al- 

 together, this flood of information is an indispensable foundation for 

 the design of long-range strategy and short-range reactions to foreign 

 developments. 



To reach independent judgments, the Congress needs a combination 

 of basic data generated by the executive branch and the results of 

 its own independent observations at first hand. However, it is un- 

 realistic to expect that the Congress could build an information base 

 comparable in depth of detail with that of the executive branch. 



