1904 



function of the institution would be its help in the maintenance of 

 continuity of congressional diplomatic policy, including support for 

 pertinent executive programs, adjustment of national priorities and 

 resource allocation, and assessment of major initiatives being devel- 

 oped by the executiv^e branch. 



CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAMS 



The difficulty encountered by the Department of State in maintain- 

 ing policy control of all aspects of U.S. foreign policy finds its counter- 

 part in the difficulty of achieving comprehensive congressional over- 

 sight of the same field and for somewhat similar reasons. The 

 Department is not staffed to maintain close technical surveillance of 

 the foreign programs of mission agencies, of the broad array of United 

 Nations activities substantially funded by the United States, nor 

 of the long list of bilateral agreements and joint commissions with 

 individual countries. Accordingly, there is no single source from which 

 the Congress can obtain full factual reports on these activities for 

 oversight purposes. If such information were promptly and comprehen- 

 sively available to the Congress, it might be possible even with present 

 staff resources of the Congress to make broad assessments of foreign 

 policy programs. Even though the findings of an oversight committee 

 of Congress may include recommendations with respect to which 

 there is no assurance of executive compliance, experience has been that 

 compliance is in fact prompted to a significant degree by congressional 

 monitoring. During the past 5 years the House International Re- 

 lations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, in a joint effort 

 with analyst support from CRS, have undertaken a sustained program 

 of review and analysis of the several hundred executive branch re- 

 ports submitted annually in compliance with about 350 separate 

 requirements contained in foreign affairs legislation. A computerized 

 record is kept of reports due and received. While this effort is only a 

 beginning, it represents a more systematic and comprehensive ap- 

 proach in principle than the past practice of giving primary attention 

 to obvious flaws in programs rather than attempting to monitor 

 more broadly the totality of execution of U.S. diplomacy. 



It is Hkely, therefore, that action to enhance foreign affairs ac- 

 (iountability to Congress will entail strengthening both the State 

 Department policy control of this field and the mechanisms of con- 

 gressional review-. Possible action regarding the Department might 

 include a statutory strengthening of departmental policy authority 

 over foreign activities of mission agencies. It might also include a 

 requirement for joint interagency reports to Congress on substantive 

 programs involving both State and another agency, or formalizing 

 interagency committees (like the Interagency Committee on Inter- 

 national Science and Technology) and charging them with responsi- 

 bility to prepare annual reports of programs and activities within 

 their cognizance. However, if the Congress is to be involved in the 

 detailed oversight of interagency programs abroad, the twin dilemma 

 must be faced of how, within constitutional bounds, to preserve 

 intact both the President's authority to act swiftly and effectively in 

 securing vital U.S. interests and the confidentiaUty of sensitive 

 foreign policy information. 



