1905 



On the congressional side, strengthening moves could include 

 intensification of recent efforts to exploit the computer faciUties of 

 Congress to build and maintain a current data bank of international 

 activities and to enable more systematic checks on compliance with 

 congressional mandates. 



The availability of computer management of data also facilitates 

 the analysis, for sustained oversight purposes, of the results of ques- 

 tionnaires addressed to foreign affairs action agencies by appropriate 

 congressional committees about programs within their jurisdiction. 



The use of exchanges of personnel between congressional and 

 departmental staffs, already suggested as a possibility for other 

 purposes, might also strengthen the congressional oversight function. 

 At the same time, it could help to build a relationship between the 

 Congress and the executive branch on foreign policy matters charac- 

 terized by constructive cooperation and acceptance of the need to 

 understand and reconcile important differences. 



CONSULTATION ON PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES 



Over the 200 years of U.S. history it has been a characteristic of 

 some Presidents to act as their own Secretaries of State, for others to 

 work in close relationship with their appointed Secretaries, and for a 

 third group to leave diplomacy primarilj'^ in the hands of the Secretary. 

 Illustrative of the first group were Presidents Wilson and Franklin 

 Roosevelt. On the other hand, both Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, 

 while keenly interested in diplomatic matters, worked for most of 

 their terms with Secretaries of State with strong personalities and a 

 style of personal diplomacy. In either of these two conditions there 

 was a tendency to bypass the Congress in the formulation of diplo- 

 matic initiatives. Only after decisions had been made and studies 

 completed was Congress informed. In the event that a treaty was 

 involved, however, the President took more pains to bring the Congress 

 into a share of the action, as for example the preparations of Presidents 

 Roosevelt and Truman for the general treaty creating the United 

 Nations and President Kennedy's preparation for the Limited Nuclear 

 Test Ban Treaty of 1963. However, in view of the deeper interest 

 of the Congress in foreign affairs and the many reasons why this 

 interest is likely to be sustained in the future, it seems reasonable to 

 expect that congressional participation with the President in the 

 shaping and winning acceptance of future foreign policy initiatives 

 wiU involve greater scope and depth than in the past. If so, a deeply 

 perceptive analytical capabUity will be required of the Congress in 

 the exercise of its constitutional functions of foreign affairs. In this 

 circumstance, it appears particularly necessary that the Congress 

 provide itself with the technical support to match qualitatively the 

 expertise of the executive branch. 



Examples of attractive areas of future joint initiatives are cited in 

 the present study. For example : 



arms negotiations, 



joint space ventures, 



international technology assessment institution, 



law of the sea, 



enlarged program of global health care, 



nuclear safeguards, 



