1936 



Among the recommendations made are the following: the need for "clarity 

 in our objectives and in the arrangements for attaining them; adequate coor- 

 dination amongst government agencies and with nongovernmental groups; 

 acceleration of many activities; initiation of new undertakings to fiS gaps; 

 and a coordinated series of guidelines for international activities." Also recom- 

 mended was improvement of mechanisms for formulating and administering 

 foreign policy with international scientific and technological components. This 

 would require: "better information on what we are doing; foreign policy evalu- 

 ation; operational evaluation; integration of U.S. scientific missions overseas 

 with other foreign policy missions; understanding of the role of science and 

 technology in technical assistance; an international role for NSF; [and] 

 greater assistance from the Federal Council for Science and Technology and 

 its International Committee." 

 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs Divi- 

 sion. Collier, Ellen and Martha Hutchinson. The Role of Advisory Committees 

 in U.S. Foreign Policy. Apr. 1975. 135 p. 



Issued as a joint committee print, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 



and House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st sess. 



U.S. National Science Foundation. Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, 



Salaries and Expenses, and Special Foreign Currency Program, Fiscal Year 



1976 to the Congress. Washington, National Science Foundation, 1975, various 



parts. 



International or foreign science and technology activities, including 

 statements on recent awards and forthcoming plans for support are included 

 in the following sections: International Cooperative Science Activities ($8 

 million requested for: cooperative science programs, scientific organizations 

 and resources program, international travel, and support for special foreign 

 currency projects) ; Science Advisory Activities Summary ($4 million re- 

 quested, including funds for research on technology transfer with Latin 

 America, assessment of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. scientific and technological agree- 

 ments, international affairs, the role of international technology transfer 

 in world trade and implications for U.S. pohcies, scientific and technical 

 policy options from a national perspective in response to the emerging 

 number of new international multilateral and bilateral relationships, and the 

 role of U.S. science and technology vis-d-vis the Soviet Union) ; and the Special 

 Foreign Currency Program ($4 million requested for scientific research and 

 information exchange.) 

 Wohlstetter, Albert. "Scientists, Seers and Strategy." Foreign Affairs, v. 41, 

 no. 3, April 1963:466-78. 



"This article is based on a longer monograph bearing the same title, 

 presented at a conference of the Council of Atomic Age Studies at Columbia 

 University . . . ." Mr. Wohlstetter discusses the merits of the political and 

 "scientific" adviser role displayed by scientists in decisions on national and 

 international security questions. He concludes: "Both the physical and the 

 behavioral sciences have a role to play in component research on cardinal 

 choices. And in the course of stvidying strategic alternatives the methods of 

 science can be used to reach conclusions going beyond the skills of any of the 

 individuals involved. The important point is that on these complex cardinal 

 questions, answers are won precariously and intermittently, in the course of 

 hard empirical inquiry into the major factors affecting choice. Intuition and 

 intelligence help, but do not make superfluous the study not only of the vital 

 technologies, but also of the behavior of men and nations using, and affected 

 by the use of, such technologies. No one has the gift of reliable foresight on 

 these cardinal choices. The primary thing, then, is not to be positive. The 

 basic failure of the physical scientists and engineers in their turbulent history 

 during the cold war is not their lack of prescience but their acting frequently 

 as if they had it." 



