1527 



" — While exclusive possession of a new technology . . . may 

 give a nation an advantage in international affairs, that advantage 

 is likely to shrink quickly." 



Once a new technology has been demonstrated it is unrealistic 

 to sup])ose that the secrets of how it is created can be kept for 

 more than a very short time. 



— For scientists and technologists to work effectively with 

 di})lomats toward the solution of complex political problems \vith 

 important technical components, "the members of each field 

 must express their respective j)oints of view fully and in terms 

 which can be understood and api)lied by members of the other 

 field. At the same time, there must be a special receptivity by 

 members of each field and a special willingness to accommodate 

 to the outlook of the other, in order to attain the ultimate goal." 



— Where the technological and political reahties which must be 

 harmonized are in sharp conflict, a special effort is required of 

 negotiators to see that all of the requirements to be reconciled 

 are fully anal3'zed and taken into account. In the Baruch Plan 

 negotiations, the dominant political reality was that an assurance 

 of the end of the serious threat to Soviet military security posed 

 by U.S. possession of the atomic bomb would have been necessary 

 in exchange for renunciation by the U.S.S.R. of its own efforts to 

 develop a nuclear weapon and accept international control. The 

 dominant technological reality was that the processes associated 

 with the ])eaceful and military uses of atomic energy were ap- 

 l)roximately the same. "And it appeared from the outset that the 

 security of a control system would have to be maintained through 

 inspections of an exceedingly intrusive character. The Soviet 

 Union was faced with this peculiar attribute of the technology of 

 atomic energy which weighed heavily on the choices of a control 

 system and which seriously challenged the closely guarded society 

 of that country. To the United States, a major consideration . . . 

 was how to penetrate the rigid secrecy of the Soviet Union in 

 order to prevent or detect its expected violation of the control 

 system . . . The negotiations neglected to reconcile [the respec- 

 tive national security requirements of the two countries] with 

 these dominant technological and political factors of atomic 

 energy in order to attain adequate and acceptable international 

 control." 



■ — ^Perhaps a guiding assumption among policymakers and 

 negotiators alike was that the technological necessities of effective 

 control would force acceptance of that control. But in reality, the 

 drive to devise effectiveness in the control system seems to have 

 ignored, if not to have defied, the need for special diplomatic 

 efforts to achieve acceptability. "The area of acceptability re- 

 ceived little if any consideration in U.S. policy discussion." 

 Underpinning the U.S. approach were "a moralistic attitude 

 which characterized the U.S. negotiating technique, arrogance 

 generated by the notion of U.S. leverage, or prejudice toward 

 Soviet science and technology. . . ." 



— In summary: "It is clear that while science and technology 

 alone could devise a control system which would be efficient in its 

 task, and diplomacy could provide the fundamentals for an 

 effective system to protect national securit}^, only a combination 



