1534 



The IAEA's first Director General, W. Strrlins; Cole — who had 

 resigned the chairmanship of the Joint Conmattce on Atomic Energy 

 to take the post — tried to structure the Agency as a channel for atomic 

 energ}" aid and as a proponent of international safety standaids and 

 international controls for nuclear fuel materials. The United States did 

 not respond to his Ansion of a strong international agency. In 1961 the 

 State Department, in agreement with the AEG, established an Ad- 

 visory Committee chaired by Dr. Henry D. Sm^-th — author of the 

 postwar "Smyth Report" — to conduct a general review of the IAEA. 

 The Advisory Committee urged tliat the IAEA be strengthened under 

 U.S. leadership and that more U.S. nuclear energy aid be clianneled 

 through the Agency i-ather than bilaterally. The State Department and 

 the AEC rejected the Advisory Committee's recommendations, pre- 

 ferring that the IAEA limit itself to such technical service functions as 

 international safeguards and inspection. 



U.S. RELATIOXSHIP TO EURATOM AND XEA 



U.S. backing of Euratom, as of the IAEA, was mixed. Secretary 

 Dulles made clear "that the United States wanted Euratom to con- 

 centrate exclusively on development of nuclear power and not aspire 

 to such greater goals as the economic welfare of the European Com- 

 whether it should manufacture enriched uranium, whether member 

 states. While some European proponents of Eiu'atom looked to it to 

 restore the influence of the six nations in world affairs, the Washington 

 view was the opposite." -^ 



Three major issues central to the establishment of Em'atom were 

 whether it should manufacture enriched uranium, whether member 

 states should be precluded from military use of atomic energy, and 

 whether Euratom should have a monopoly over nuclear materials. 



For security reasons, the United States opposed foreign production 

 of enriched uranium, and retained its monopol}^ by guaranteeing an 

 adequate supply to Euratom at reasonable prices. The idea — derived 

 from the Atoms for Peace concept — that Euratom could serve to pre- 

 vent nuclear armament in Europe was stillborn because of French 

 insistence on the right to produce and use atomic weapons for national 

 security. Yet the French pressed successfully for a Euratom monopoly 

 of nuclear supplies for commercial purposes. By pointing to tlie U.S. 

 example in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, v.hich took title to all 

 nuclear materials in the Nation and forbade private ownership, the 

 French prevailed over West German opposition to nuclear monopoly 

 as incompatible with the principles of a free-market economy. 



The United States did participate with Euratom in a joint power 

 program, using U.S. nuclear technology, v.diich resulted in the con- 

 struction of three operating nuclear powerplants with a combined out- 

 put of about 600 megawatts. The goal had been six plants and 1,000 

 megawatts. In the negotiations leading to the bilateral agreement 

 covering this program, the only significant issues were over U.S. 

 inspection i^ights and safeguards with respect to nuclear materials 

 supplied by the United States. The U.S. negotiators wanted to send 

 inspectors into nuclear facilities of European member states; the 

 Euratom negotiators refused. A resulting compromise provided for 



28 Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 205-206. 



