1539 



— If the IAEA had evolved in tlie direction indicated by the 

 Atoms for Peace proposal, it could have had a major influence 

 on development of commercial nuclear energy in Europe as a 

 channel for technical assistance and nuclear materials. However, 

 because of cold war tensions, the United States chose not to 

 promote the Agency as a distributor, or custodian of a pool, of 

 nuclear materials; neither did it support an international regula- 

 tory role for the Agency in the design and operation of nuclear 

 powerplants. On the other hand, the Agency provided a forum 

 in which United States and Soviet representatives could meet in 

 a relatively friendly atmosphere at a time when most contacts 

 between the two countries were strained and formal, if not 

 hostile. (Vol. 1, pp. 201-202) 



— The experience of Euratom illustrated a diplomatic reality: 

 the poUtical cohesion of members of an international technologi- 

 cal undertaking is a prerequisite to its success, not simply a 

 desirable byproduct. As a corollary, the troubles of Euratom's 

 R. & D. programs illustrate also how the cohesive force of inter- 

 nationalism in science may not be strong enough to withstand 

 the divisive forces of national commercial interests. (Vol. I, p. 214) 



— A tenet of modern management, private or public, is that an 

 organization must plan ahead, particularly organizations that 

 seek to create and apply new technologies. (Vol. I, p. 214) 



— The Treaty of Kome is silent on the issue of environmental 

 protection. Euratom has no statutory functions of ascertaining 

 and controlling the environmental effects of nuclear power and 

 fuel reprocessing plants. (Vol. I, p. 221) 



— Euratom and the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency overlap 

 in many of their interests and activities. Euratom's usefulness 

 appears to be handicapped by the dispersion of human and 

 financial resources of its member states between its own pro- 

 grams and those of the NEA and IAEA. (Vol. I, p. 222) 



— Moves toward European unity such as the establishment of 

 Euratom have been eroded by a wave of nuclear nationalism. 

 Euratom's successes have come in activities which were linked 

 to the competitive status of the national nuclear industries of 

 France, Italy, and West Germany. Inability to form a common 

 European approach to nuclear technology has proved advan- 

 tageous to the U.S. nuclear industry [but perhaps at the expense 

 of long-range U.S. national goals and interests]. (Vol. I, p. 224) 



— The lessons of the diplomatic effort of organizing joint U.S.- 

 Euratom programs for nuclear power production could point 

 the way toward future joint ventures to develop other new power 

 sources, such as large-scale use of solar energ}^ (Vol. I, p. 2.38) 



— From World War II to Sputnik, U.S. world technological 

 leadership went unchallenged and was sustained in large part by 

 advances in nuclear science and technology. Rather than seek 

 to monopolize this leadership, the United States offered and 

 supplied technological assistance to many countries, especially 

 in Europe, to develop their own use of nuclear power. During 

 the late 1960s, U.S. world leadership was challenged by other 

 nations. Looking to the 1970s and to an era of greater peaceful 

 rather than military competition, there are several fundamental 



