1546 



THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND SAFEGUARDS 



How close is the point of no return in the worldwide use of nuclear power bej'ond 

 which it will not be possible to halt, slow down, or contain further growth? 



What are the potential implications for U.S. diploinacj- of: 

 — A substantial theft or diversion of nuclear materials? 

 — The successful use of stolen materials for purposes of terrorism, extortion, 

 or foreign policy? 



What, if any, preparations should the United States be making now to respond 

 to the situations of question (2)? 



What arc the potential implications for U.S. diplomacy' of: 



— An accident in a nuclear facility at home or abroad that causes large 

 offsite injur}^ and contamination? 



ilffective safeguards will require extraordinary measures to learn about, pre- 

 vent, or intercept thefts of nuclear materials, or to recover stolen materials. What 

 is the U.S. assessment of the need for a world protective or police force with j^or- 

 haps supranational powers to give safeguards credibility? Are safeguards important 

 enough to the United States to induce it to accept the problems and risks of such a 

 force — especially if its members incli;ded nationals from the Soviet Union, its 

 satellites, and mainland China? 



To what extent should the United States in its bilateral and multilateral agree- 

 ments extend safeguards terms and conditions beyond those expected of the 

 IAEA under the NPT? 



W ithin the United States what are the respective safeguards fimctions, respon- 

 sibilities, and authorities of the Department of State, the Arms Control and Dis- 

 armament Agency, ERDA, the National Research Council (NRC), and the De- 

 partments of Defense and Commerce? Who is responsible for coordination of these 

 P'edcral activities? How are these activities coordinated with U.S. foreign policy? 



What level of international effort would be needed to assure reasonably effective 

 safeguards in an international plutonium economy? How should this be financed? 

 What should be the nature and extent of U.S. participation? 



Should the IAEA be transformed into a world nuclear safeguards agency V 

 Should the safeguards function be transferred to a new, separate international 

 agency with no other functions? 



To what extent should U.S. diplomacy seek to expand international safeguards 

 to include phj^sical protection of nuclear materials, interception of attempts to steal 

 materials, and recovery of stolen materials? 



Man}' developing countries appear to be less concerned with safeguards thnn 

 with acquiring the benefits of nuclear power. How are the}' to be persuaded that 

 the need for safeguards is not a "put-on" designed to serve the convenience of the 

 nations which already have nuclear power? 



To what extent would placing U.S. nuclear fuel facilities for civil nuclear power 

 under IAEA safeguards by voluntary action reduce or neutralize expressed fears 

 and concerns of nonweapons nations that IAEA safeguards maj' violate their 

 sovereignty, or put their nuclear industries at a disadvantage? 



CASE THREE— THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 



GEOPHYSICAL YEAR^" 



Statement of the Case 



The Intenialional Geophj'sical Year or IGY (July 1, 1957-Decem- 

 ber 31, 195S) was the most ambitious venture in international scientific 

 cooperation in history-. Broadly speakin";, it had as its purpo-e the 

 observation of phenomena relating to the entire Earth and evei'ylhing 

 in and around it. It enlisted the services of tens of thousands of 

 scientists and volunteer observei's from 07 nations, working at ^ome 

 8,000 observation stations around the wo.'ki. It yielded much scientific 

 data, was attended by significant technological achievements, and 

 stimulated other major international coopei alive efforts invohing 

 science and technology in the years to follow. 



"' U.S. Congre.s.s, Uouse, Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs, The PoUficul legacy of ttu Intrrnntional Oin- 

 pfiysical Year, a sttidy in the series on Science, Technolcpy, an<l Aiiu'rican Diplomacy pretiared for the 

 Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold Bullis, Scieiue Policy 



Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Coi'.gicss, Washington, U.S. Government 



Printing Ollicc, November 1973. See vol. I, pp. 294-360. 



