1561 



On this rather unusual and extemporized foundation was erected the organiza- 

 tion to plan and administer a, regional program covering three-quarters of the 

 drainage ba-^in of the tenth largest river in the world, a region larger than France, 

 with a population of perhaps 30 million. ^^ 



By the time of President Johnson's proposal for a bilhon-dollar aid 

 program featuring the Mekong regional plan, a complex of 21 countries, 

 12 U.N. agencies, and 7 private institutions were contributing support 

 to the project — donations and pledges were to reach $68 million by the 

 end of 1965 — and the technical and administrative resources of the 

 coordination committee's executive agent and staff were expanding. 

 France, India, and New Zealand were collaborating on preliminary 

 plans for a major dam at Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia; a Japanese 

 team was at work on the Sambor Dam, also in Cambodia; the United 

 States was taking the lead ($2.5 million in feasibility studies) in con- 

 nection with a third great dam at Pa Mong in Thailand. Australia 

 had a half-million-dohar program of geologic studies underway at both 

 Sambor and Pa Mong Dam sites. In addition, construction was in 

 progress on dams, channel markers, and other engineering or pre- 

 paratory projects on tributary streams feeding the Mekong.*"^ 



In short, the enterprise to which the President proposed to extend 

 massive support was no mere flight of fancy but a major project in 

 being, backed by a strong and broadly based multinational commit- 

 ment to see it through. At the same time, it could be considered a 

 grossly underfinanced enterprise, proceeding at a pace which would 

 require many years for completion of most of its elements and even 

 decades for some. Was it not appropriate, then, for the nation which 

 had fathered "the first regional development project to command 

 worldwide attention — the Tennessee Valley Authority" ^* to offer 

 assistance in accelerating the progress of this enterprise, as a construc- 

 tive contribution to a negotiated peace? 



The U.S. and world press in general found it appropriate, though 

 recognizing the offer as part of a ''carrot and stick" approach. 



The timing of the speech coincided with stepped-up bombing of strategic targets 

 in North Vietnam by U.S. military aircraft, beginning with isolated strikes in mid- 

 February, and broadening into a more sustained air offensive in early March. It 

 followed by a week the President's decision, to be disclosed later on, to deploy U.S. 

 troops and undertake ground combat operations in South Vietnam (to an extent 

 that would number 184,314 military personnel in the area by the end of 1^65).^^ 



But Hanoi was not in a bargaining mood: 



The determined nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict . . . re- 

 mained obdurately aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an alternative to a 

 prospective ultimate victory. ^^ 



U.S. Involvement 



A succession of three studies was undertaken between 1951 and 

 1958 to explore the potential for a regional development program for 

 the Lower Basin of the Mekong. The first of these was carried out by 

 the Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources Development of 

 ECAFE. The second, made at the request of the Riparian States 



6-' Ibid., p. 381. 



•^^ Iliid..\i.'A'M). (Talilr 1 of the study, pages 301-394. prosonts an imprrssive list of ipsourccs, including ongi- 

 nt'oring and other toclinical services, contril)uled or ph^dgod l)y the various countries, agencies, and institu- 

 tions support ingt lie project as of January lOe.'i.) 



6* Ihid., pp. 36;3-366. 



65 Iliid., p. 366. 



66 Ibid., p. 430. 



