1564 



of support for the project, with no nation monopoHzing the leader- 

 ship; the other, the major contributions made by the United States, 

 both officially and unofficially. A sampling of activities of the years 

 f 962-64 will'illustrate: 



In 1964, a first geological map of the basin was completed. In France, work was 

 proceeding on a mathematical model of the river while representatives from the 

 Columbia River headquarters of the U.S. Corps of Engineers were undertaking 

 a system study of the Mekong. Studies were underway by the World Health 

 Organization of the problems of malaria and schistosomiasis in the basin. Scores 

 of hydrologic and meteorologic stations had been set up and a radio network 

 linked them to headquarters in Bangkok, where their reports were collected and 

 tabulated. The Bureau of Reclamation was beginning work on a feasibility study 

 of the Fa Mong Dam. Stream gradient measurements on the main stem had been 

 completed in 1961 and measurement of the capacity of possible reservoirs was 

 actively proceeding. In 1964, ECAFE completed an agricultural market analysis. 

 Resources for the Future, Inc., had begun a study of world demand for products 

 of electro-processing industries. A study of manpower needs and resources was 

 begun in 1962, with the International Labor Office as lead agency. The Food and 

 Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and Israel, were studying 

 agricultural improvement methods; plans were underway for farm and timber 

 demonstration projects. ''^ 



With a broad base of support and stepped-up pace, the character 

 of the investigations changed markedl}' as the project proceeded: 



Not onh^ w^as the scope of the pertinent data recognized as far wider than it 

 had been in the 1950s, but primary emphasis was shifting to the economic and 

 social consequences of proposed constructions and development. In the United 

 States, river basin development had followed this trend, but the conversion to 

 total system planning had taken more than a century; benefiting from U.S. 

 experience, the Mekong planning activity had achieved it in less than a decade." 



Role of Congress 



Congressional reaction to the President's speech of April 7, 1965, 

 was mixed. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield saw the speech 

 as a U.S. commitment to help make the peace, once obtained, "a 

 dynamic peace, a peace of constructive benefit, not only to the 

 people of Vietnam, North and South, but to Southeast Asia as a 

 whole." Congressman Zablocki asserted that the "principal object" 

 of the speech had been insufficiently recognized: "That is the bold 

 move to stabilize Southeast Asia and assist the peaceful progress of 

 the people in that area through a multi-national program of economic 

 assistance, directed b}^ the United Nations, in which Communist 

 nations would be invited to participate." Senator McGovern declared 

 that peace in Asia "... means precisel}^ the kind of imaginative 

 effort the President proposed . . ., including regional develop- 

 ment . . . and experienced assistance from the best people available 

 in the field of international development." Senator Moss added that 

 the speech "represents a major breakthrough in international posture." 

 On the other hand. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen ques- 

 tioned the feasibilit}^ of an attempt to "buy peace with an American 

 aid program," and Congressman Gerald R. Ford declared that 

 . . . friendship, security, and solid international relationships cannot 

 be bought with dollars." ^* 



Despite forebodings. Congress supported the proposal advanced in 

 the Johns Hopkins speech of April 7, 1965. When the President in a 



'2 Ibid., pp. 389-390. 



'3 Ibid., p. 390. 



7< Ibid.. Di). .368-.36n. 



