1610 



in fields of high technology like space and the computer, it has begun to show 

 defects, and, in Gilpin's opinion, "the direction of America's technological strategy 

 will become an increasingly important political issue." '^^ 



Gilpin argued that, first of all, "even America does not have the 

 economic and technical resources to support all projects of impor- 

 tance; it too must choose. Second, a high proportion of the limited 

 resources has gone into militar}' and military-related projects, while 

 pressing social and economic ideas of the society have been neglected. 

 Third, the devastating consequence of technological advance for 

 the environment has suddenly emerged as a major national 

 concern. . . ." ^^^ 



Accordingly, the study suggests, "thought might be given . . . 'to 

 the formulation of a more explicit technological strategy designed to 

 increase the social return of its immense investment in science and 

 technology and to minimize its negative environmental effects.' Gilpin 

 concludes with a prediction that" : 



. . . To a degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological 

 considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and conflicts seek 

 their expression and work themselves out. In a world where nuclear weaponry 

 has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands 

 play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a nation's 

 technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international 

 pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems."' 



The study observes that the great efforts of the United States in 

 science and technology — since 1940, at least — were inspired by external 

 events. The Manhattan Project was initiated out of fear that Nazi 

 Germany might achieve nuclear weapons first. Work on the H-bomb 

 was impelled by the conviction that it was necessary to beat the 

 Russians to it. The Polaris ballistic-missile submarine was a response 

 to the Soviet missile threat. The whole first decade of the space race 

 was an effort to catch up with and pass the Soviets in a strategically 

 and psychologically important area in which they had assumed a lead. 

 "The great technological programs supported by the United States 

 are still in military, atomic, and space developments, and all are 

 motivated by events outside the United States or else support for 

 them wanes." '^* 



Indeed, it is no secret that man}^ U.S. domestic programs owe a 

 substantial measure of their support to the circumstance that they 

 can be tied to the coattails of programs related to military security. 

 Professor Harvey Brooks of Harvard declares that national defense 

 is too often used as justification for doing what is needed simply for 

 the good of American society. For example: 



We backed into Federal support of higher education while stoutly insisting 

 that we were only buying necessary military research results. We entered upon 

 school curriculum reform, long ov^erdue, on the grounds that it was needed to 

 make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counterparts. We 

 launched a gigantic interstate highway program on the grounds that it was needed 

 for national defense. We fostered the study of international affairs and the 

 development of foreign area research on the grounds that a great power needed 

 this knowledge to maintain its power position.'^' 



135 Ibid., p. G7G. 



13' Itj:a. 



133 HM.. pp. 070-077. 

 139 Ibicl., p. 077. 



