1633 



physical and technological conditions combined with organizational 

 and educational strengths to assure a self-reliant and well-nourished 

 population. 



It is tempting to attribute the food/population unbalance in develop- 

 ing countries today to a lag in technology. Unquestionably, Nanes 

 concedes, it is a factor. However, a more notable deficiencj' — 



... is the general deficiency in knowledge of the complex factors involved. 

 The processes of population growth are not understood. The statistics of food 

 and population are poor. Even the techniques for disseminating improved tech- 

 nology are faulty. Under these conditions, the negotiation of positive diplomatic 

 arrangements and the task of planning programs to achieve the goal of food/ 

 population balance tend to be unsystematic and episodic.'^" 



The theme of the inadequacy of data on food and population runs 

 throughout the paper. Data are needed for diagnosis of the problems, 

 formulation of policy, design of ameliorative programs, and setting 

 of practicable long-range goals. Associated with the lack of data for 

 these purposes are two other deficiencies: (1) insufficient understand- 

 ing of the cultural dynamics of each individual society, including its 

 readiness to accept or adapt particular technologies of food production 

 or population control; and (2) the low level of education. 



It would seem to be essential that the base of education be strengthened in 

 all countries so that their peoples can understand the reality of the problem, and 

 to assure that the best available technology bearing on the food/people equation 

 is ever3'where available and in the hands of people competent to use it. "' 



U.S. Involvement 



Recognition in the United States of the need of the developing 

 countries for enhanced agricultural technology came early. From 

 the outset of foreign aid programs after World War II their content 

 was extensively technological. Their scope encompassed improvements 

 in fertilizer practice, genetic strains, irrigation, farm mechanization, 

 food preservation and storage, and marketing systems. However, 

 defects in the programs were frequent: in the appropriateness of 

 particular technologies to the cultures of various of the developing 

 countries, in the willingness and ability of the aided peoples to use 

 the transplanted technologies, and in the basic data required for 

 planning and programing to introduce improved practices. 



Awareness of the population side of the food/people equation as 

 an appropriate target for U.S. policy lagged nearly a decade behind 

 the attention to the factor of food. Thus, in 1959, President Eisen- 

 hower declared that, "This Government has not, and will not as long 

 as I am here, have a positive political doctrine in its program that 

 has to do with this problem of birth control. That is not our business." 

 At that time, Nanes observes, the "population explosion" had not at- 

 tracted general awareness. However, by 1965, Mr. Eisenhower had 

 reversed his stand "when he came out in favor of measures authoriz- 

 ing the Government to cope effectively with the need to slow down 

 and then stabilize the world's population growth." ^^^ 



'6" 76!d., pp. 774-775. 



161 /bid., p. 862. 



162 /6(d., pp. 777-778. 



