1682 



of science and technology to the war effort, of a great impetus in 

 industrial technology following the close of the war — an expectation 

 which was to be fulfilled. "Less evident, but still consequential, was 

 the concept that national excellence in science and technology was a 

 form of demonstration of national power and world influence." ^^* 



THE BERKNER REPORT 



The first comprehensive effort to assess the importance of science 

 and technology to U.S. diplomacy was that of the 1950 Berkner 

 Report. Apparently in response to ideas generated by the Hoover 

 Commission's 1948-49 study of the organization of the executive 

 branch for the conduct of foreign affairs — a study which in itself did 

 not address the role of the State Department in this field — the Secre- 

 tary of State in October 1949 appointed Lloyd V. Berkner as Special 

 Consultant to advise him on responsibilities and functions of the De- 

 partment in formulating and implementing international aspects of 

 national science policy, and related organization and staffing. Under 

 Berkner's guidance, a Departmental Steering Committee on Interna- 

 national Science Policy conducted a study culminating in a report 

 which "for more than a decade prescribed the organizational framework 

 and philosophic concept of science and technology in the Department 

 of State"— 



. . . The durable effect of this report was beneficial in a number of ways: 



(1) It emphasized the importance of science for diplomacy. 



(2) It identified important functions of a scientific apparatus as a component 

 of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus. 



(3) It prescribed the necessary interaction of overseas scientific attaches with a 

 strong backstopping unit at home. 



(4) It addressed the need for coordination of the State scientific office with other 

 agencies with scientific functions. 



(5) It called attention to the importance of the U.S. nongovernmental scientific 

 community for the Department of State — and vice versa. 



On the other hand, the report had a number of adverse consequences: 



(1) The array of proposed functions for science attaches was unrealistically 

 wide in scope, without establishing priorities of emphasis. 



(2) The important distinction between science as somewhat international 

 and technology as more closely related to national policy and objectives, was 

 neglected; similarly the heavy emphasis on science and the interchange of scientific 

 information obscured the larger importance of technology for diplomacy and of 

 the role of technological analysis as an input to foreign policy formulation. 



(3) No assessment was presented of potential scientific and technological 

 interests of the Department of State in the geographic and economic bureaus, in 

 State Intelligence and Research, in the in-house educational activities of the 

 Department, and especially in the Policy Planning Staff. 



(4) The relationship of the proposed new scientific organization to the White 

 House and the National Security Council was not discussed. ^^ 



ESTABLISHMENT OF POST OF SCIENCE ADVISER 



. The Berkner Report resulted in the establishment of the State 

 Department post of Science Adviser and Special Assistant. This new 

 office had barely had time to define its role, hire a staff, and begin 

 to function, however, when it was overtaken by a departmental 

 retrenchment. By 1956 the State Department science organization 

 had dwindled to a caretaker Foreip;n Service Officer and two 

 secretaries. 



284 Ibid., p. 1336. 

 2«« Ibid., p. 1347. 



