1686 



There were obvious questions as to the extent of support that the new bureau 

 would receive from the Secretary of State, the relationships to be established 

 with other bureaus of the Department, and the rapport with the National Science 

 Foundation, its National and International Division, and the new Science and 

 Technology Policy Office, among other interested agencies. 



Internally^ the new Assistant Secretary would also have the opportunity to 

 chart a number of new courses. . . . ^"^ 



But Dr. Ray was not — at least in her own estimate — given that 

 opportunity. On June 19, 1975, she submitted her resignation to 

 Secretary Kissinger, regretting unfulfillment of her hope that her 

 Bureau would play a significant role in the formation of the De- 

 partment's science policy and in "the provision of information upon 

 which to base policy in those areas of technology specifically assigned 

 to the OES Bureau by Congress." In a letter of the following day tb 

 President Ford, she asserted that "Under present Departmental pro- 

 cedures, the Bureau can do little but acquiesce in the policies set by 

 others, and attempt to implement its broad responsibilities with 

 little authority and few resources." ^"^ 



Role of Congress 



The observation was made in 1964 that "it was Congress and not 

 the State Department or the White House that first saw the broad 

 implications of science's penetration into all segments of foreign 

 pohcy." 2^^ 



EARLIER CONGRESSIONAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND 



FOREIGN POLICY 



This early congressional awareness took the form of a study planned 

 by the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1958 

 and contracted to Stanford Research Institute in January 1959. The 

 SRI report, completed in July 1959, was entitled "Possible Non- 

 military Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on 

 Foreign Policy Problems of the United States." It presented three 

 main conclusions: (1) the progress of science and technology will do 

 more to create or intensify problems that must engage the attention 

 of foreign policy planners than to solve or ameliorate such problems 

 "unless deliberate policy measures are taken"; (2) "the security and 

 well-being of the United States call for a reappraisal of present 

 allocations of scientific and technological effort with a view to directing 

 more effort toward nonmilitary foreign policy challenges"; and (3) 

 foreign policy planning from a broad perspective, making use of the 

 best scientific assistance, "will be a critical requirement in the years 

 ahead." ''* 



In November 1962 the House Committee on Science and Astro- 

 nautics(now Science and Technology) , in a brief staff study, proposed 

 that the committee periodically review the coordination of national 

 scientific and technological policies and programs with respect to 

 cost, adequacy, effectiveness, and such questions as: 



2" Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1370. 



282 The two letters arc reproduced in full below, following the section headed Some Illus trative Questions. 



2M Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1450. The quotation is from a book 

 by Donald W. Cox, America's New Policy Makers: The Scientists' Rise to Power (New York, Chilton Books, 

 1964), p. 8. 



2" Ibid., p. 1450. 



