1692 



Compared to the resources lavished on management improvement in a single 

 large multinational corporation, those being devoted to the far more important 

 and difficult problems of improving the organization of the government in a 

 multinational setting are pitiful.'" 



THE DEPARTMENT IS NOT ORGANIZED TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL 



PLANNING 



A generation after the need for long-range foreign policy planning 

 in relation to national goals was recognized, and provision made for 

 it within the State Department structure, there are still no effective 

 mechanisms and procedures whereby State can "anticipate the need 

 for, and . . . initiate, action — especially future-oriented action — in 

 these fields [of science and technology], rather than responding to- 

 foreign pressures." ^^^ In the words of the aforementioned United 

 Nations Association panel report, "the Department of State, as 

 currently oriented, organized, staffed, and operated, represents some- 

 thing of an anachronism in terms of ability to respond to today's 

 global problems. . . . The new and highly complex demands of a 

 technologically oriented international society, with its new set of 

 economic interdependencies and need for shared responsibility in keep- 

 ing the peace, have simply overtaken the Department's traditional 

 decisionmaking structure." ^'^ 



PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP HAS NOT MOTIVATED THE NECESSARY 

 TECHNICAL MODERNIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT 



The State Department has never had, and is not yet in striking 

 distance of having, a substantial capability for putting American 

 technological and managerial genius to work in the service of American 

 diplomacy. This lack, however, would appear to be not so much a 

 failure of the State Department per se as of American political leader- 

 ship generally, in the legislative branch as well as the executive, and 

 of American business and industrial leadership as well. There would 

 appear to be a great untapped potential for beneficial accommoda- 

 tion between U.S. Government and U.S. business in the interests of 

 U.S. diplomacy — and also, on an "everybody wins" basis rather than 

 a "zero-sum" basis, the interests of the world at large. With an 

 historic tendency for government and academia to be ranged sus- 

 piciously on one side, and business and industr}^ equally suspiciously 

 on the other, the impetus, the leadership, and the institutions for 

 exploring this potential have been not enough in evidence. As the 

 starting point, a philosophy of accommodation, including appropriate 

 checks and balances, would seem to be needed; this could be the 

 product of a national debate involving preparation of executive 

 branch policy or position papers, holding of congressional hearings,, 

 and use of the media by academic, corporate, and other private 

 interests. Such a debate might be launched on the initiative of the 

 administration, a congressional committee (or two or more commit- 

 tees acting in concert) , or a public-interest group of citizens.' 



311 Ibid., p. 1475. 



312 Ibid., p. 1327. 



313 Ibid., p. 1475. 



