1724 



in lagging parts of the world might serve U.S. foreign policy objectives 

 in the long run." ^^^ Accordingly, the possibility that "the concept 

 might serve as an instrument of long-range diplomacy seems worth 

 further examination and putting to the test." ^^^ 



Some of the points made in the study tend to support this concept. 

 One is the remarkable forbearance, for a long time, of Communist 

 insurgents in their non-interference with the progress of the Mekong 

 program. Another is the way in which nationals of the different Ripar- 

 ian States were able to talk and work together in Bangkok, making 

 policy and plans even when some of their governments had broken 

 off diplomatic relations with each other. A third point is the extraor- 

 dinary durability of the project itself, which survived wave after 

 wave of political and military upheavals, emerging larger and stronger 

 each time. A fourth point is a psychological effect that many observers 

 have remarked: an attitude of cooperation on the part of the partic- 

 ipants that has been styled the "Spirit of the Mekong." 



It is possible that, in an unobtrusive and apohtical way, other such 

 regional multistate projects could be initiated in troubled areas of the 

 world like the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, North Africa, 

 the Sahel, Rhodesia and the neighboring states, and regions of Central 

 and South America. Investment of capital is an essential ingredient, 

 but there are others of importance: skill in planning, participation 

 and cooperation of nationals from states with long histories of suspicion 

 and dissonance, technological skills, and so on. Nor would it be neces- 

 sary for the United States in taking such initiatives to assure a domi- 

 nant role and high profile. The gains could be twofold : in an increased 

 confidence and willingness to cooperate in the region, and the tangible 

 rewards of technological development of resources and commerce. 



CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed 



Perhaps the principal lesson of this case study in reference to the 

 initiative/reactive question — one which applies both internationally 

 and domestically — is that there may be severe limitations on initiative 

 when there are many interested parties with conflicting views. This 

 study explains the slow progress toward a U.S. position in these words: 

 "National honor, national security, sovereignty, and territorial claims 

 all combine to intensify feelings and delay the building of a 

 consensus." ^^^ 



Another lesson to be drawn from the study is that the huge stakes 

 involved require that sooner or later a generally acceptable resolution 

 of the issue of the rights to the ocean floor must be found. The ques- 

 tion is whether it will be arrived at by diplomatic processes, by 

 economic accretion, or by force of arms. It would be fortunate for 

 the world's nations if a U.S. initiative could be devised to lead the 

 way to a final resolution by the first of these three options. 



It is not hard to understand why an issue of such great moment 

 should remain so long unresolved. Yet here, surely, is an opportunity 

 for decisive U.S. initiative, based on long and thoughtful analysis, 



330 Huddle, Mekong Project, vol. 1, p. 431. 



"1 Ibid., p432. 



332 U.S. Congress, House, Comniittee on Foreign Affairs, Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed, a study in 

 the scries on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National 

 Security Policy and Sci^entific Developments by^ George Dounianij^ Sj;ience Pq[icy Research_pivisionj 

 Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971: 

 vol. I, p. 517. 



