1725 



Planning, and preparation. Unlike the atomic bomb issue that strucl? 

 J.S. diplomats unawares, the seabed question has evolved slowly; 

 tapping the oil in the seabed of the Gulf of Mexico and off the Cali- 

 fornia Coast came in the 1940s. The early 1960s saw the ill-fated 

 Mohole Project, which demonstrated the feasibility of deep ocean 

 drilling. Knowledge of the manganese nodules has been with us for 

 half a century. Much of the substance of the 19th century diplomacy 

 dealt with fishing rights. In two grei^t wars, 1812 and 1917, issues of 

 freedom of the seas were at stake. Now, in the context of dwindling 

 global reserves of petroleum and minerals, and food from the sea, with 

 many claimants for these valuable resources, the control of the inter- 

 national commons of the oceans remains unresolved and a continuing 

 threat to international amity. 



CASE six: tj.s.-soviet commercial relations 



This study offers two important lessons regarding the formulation 

 of initiatives — and, conversely, regarding the shaping of reactions — = 

 of one "superpower" to another. Failure to exploit the expanding 

 commercial opportunities toward detente between the United States 

 and the Soviet Union could have unfortunate consequences: 



The present period appears to be a critical one in U.S.-Soviet relations. 

 If the two countries move ahead in developing commercial relations, progress 

 in political, cultural, and other areas may be facilitated. The failure to do so 

 may engender disappointments, frustrations, and suspicions which could ulti- 

 mately result in a return to the pre-Summit atmosphere. In short, an opportunity 

 is now available to the United States which might conceivably lead to either sub- 

 stantially expanded relations over a 10- to 20-year period or, if the opportunity 

 is not seized and U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade is not now expanded, to continued diversion 

 of the Soviet market to Western European and Japanese suppliers and to a sharp 

 deterioration in Soviet-U.S. relations.^^^ 



The other lesson is that initiatives must be built on knowledge, 

 rather than hopes or expectations: 



Because political benefits are the main measure of net gain to the United States 

 from any pattern of increased U.S.-Soviet trade, careful calibration of the risks 

 and uncertainties is in order. 



If the Soviet Union is indeed in the process of reordering priorities and accepting 

 greater involvement in the international political and economic system — i.e., 

 accepting the rules of behavior of that system — a significant reduction of impedi- 

 ments to trade may result: this would be much more beneficial to the United States 

 than would the modest economic gains to be derived from expanding markets. 



If, however, Soviet trade overtures do not extend further than a willingness to 

 settle old accounts, such as Lend Lease, and purchase of more grain and techno- 

 logically advanced equipment, in exchange for relaxation of trade and credit 

 restrictions, U.S. policymakers may be well advised to limit concessions and 

 engage in hard bargaining, with expectation of only modest political and economic 

 benefits. 



The policies followed by the United States and the Soviet Union will greatly 

 influence the probabilities of alternative outcomes. As the policy objectives of the 

 Soviet leaders are especially crucial to such a projection, it cannot be known for 

 some time with any certainty which different alternative courses, or what com- 

 promise between them, is being followed. 



Thus as knowledge of which of the alternatives will prevail may not be evident 

 for several years, very careful official and public scrutiny of each step in the 

 progress of the Joint L'.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission discussions would 

 appear to be in order for both the executive and legislative branches. 



?''■ U.S. Congress, Tlouse, Committep on Forpign Affairs, V.S.-Soikt Commercial Relations: The Interplay 

 of Economics, Technoln(i>/ Transfer, and Diplomacy ,:i study in the series on Science, Teehnolofry, and American 

 Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by 

 Jolin P. Hardt and George D. HoUiday, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington^ 

 D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973: vol. I, p. 606. 



