172G 



These two observations can be generalized to the two propositions 

 that an activist foreign policy can be constructive, but that it must 

 have a firm foundation of supporting knowledge of the real world. 



ISSUE one: the evolution of international technology 



This early study in the series develops the theme of the importance 

 of technology for diplomacy. Thus, "technology has been shown 

 capable of advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives, but it is neither 

 infallible nor invariably beneficial." 



The question, then, is how to determine what the Federal policy should be 

 with respect to technology, for purposes of U.S. diplomacy. It is certain, in any 

 event, that technology will continue to advance. Once set in motion, it has a 

 momentum of its own. The question is whether and how the dynamics of this 

 changing feature of the American culture can be guided and directed to serve the 

 objectives of U.S. international relations. Implicit in this question is the further 

 issue of whether such diplomatic gains should be pursued or abandoned when they 

 are found to conflict with domestic or regional programs. What sacrifices are 

 necessarj'? Are the}^ tolerable? Who should decide? Who should determine the 

 rules of the game — the criteria and values on which the choice is made? What 

 organizational resources are available to make these decisions? Are they adequate 

 for the purpose? What else needs to be done? ^^* 



A short section of the study recounts the "Frustration of U.S. 

 Efforts to Wield Technological Power." During the period 1950-70, 

 despite many seeming opportunities for the United States to assert a 

 constructive world leadership by enlisting its technological superi- 

 ority, "the undoubted promise of technology had not achieved ful- 

 fillment." The study asked why — 



Was it because technologists were unable to produce unflav/ed innovations? 

 Were the diplomats unable to specify the performance of technologies for global 

 effects? Was there an insufficient coupling of technologists with diplomats to 

 achieve proper teamwork toward a successful product? Where did — and do — 

 the weaknesses lie? ^^* 



This perplexity, expressed in 1970, is altogether as valid today. Why 

 indeed has superior U.S. technology been so weakly employed as an 

 instrument of diplomacy? 



One answer to this question. was suggested in the study: 



It seems evident that modern diplomats and policym.akers require special 

 training in imdersianding and using technology, and in formulating plans that 

 involve the new uses or development of new kinds of technology. Parliaments are 

 called upon to evaluate and approve agreements and treaties with a technological 

 content. New information is needed for assessing the relationship between tech- 

 nological information and practical politics.^^^ 



There were abundant opportunities for the diplomatic exploitation 

 of technological leadership, and the Nation \\as internationally 

 active in many of them. The study noted the growth — 



... of international participation in Earth satellite systems for global com- 

 munications, resource surveys, weather prediction, navigation, and other usefui 

 services derived from the space program. One effect of this activity has been to 

 advertise globr.lly the technological accomplishments of the United States m ai 

 difficult and costly field. .Another effect has V)oen to encoiirage a global attitude 

 toward the Karth itself — perceiving it as itself a "spaceship," whose passenger?* 

 share its fate, irrespective of country or region. A third effect is tO' tie together 



33» U.S. Congress, TIoii'^'\ romir.ittroon Foroiptn AlTair?, The Kiohilinv (if Inlcrnalional 7Vc/i7?o?r)(7j/, astudy 

 In Ihc .series on Science, Techuoio^'y. and Ameri<'au Diploiaacy preiiiivfd for the Suhcommittcp on National 

 Security I'olicyiind Sdentific Devolnpnvnts by Frivuklin P. Huddle, Science I'ojicy Research Divisioa, 

 Congressional Research Service," Library of CorigreVs, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970: 

 vol. II, p. 619. 



335 jbid., p. 627. 



336 Ibid., p. 652. 



