1743 



through the more traditional and presumably more potent and durable 

 mstruments of international relations." 

 On the one hand they were beneficial — - 



In retrospect, negotiation and administration of the safeguards provisions of 

 the U.S. nuclear bilateral agreements has proven to be a unique and extraordinary- 

 achievement in international relations. The technological promise of nuclear 

 power, reinforced by incentives and pressures of foreign policy, gave the United 

 States the unusual right to send its own inspectors into foreign jurisdications to 

 inspect and verify the use and holding of U.S. -supplied nuclear materials. That 

 no major confrontation has arisen from the administration of the safeguard pro- 

 visions of the bilateral agreements gives reasons for some optimism in the future 

 of international relations. For, despite the arguments and analyses of those who 

 consider sovereign rights unalterable, there can be pragmatic yieldings and 

 accommodations when this is sufficiently in a nation's interest.*'" 



On the other hand, their existence may serve to obstruct progress in 

 international control: 



The success of the U.S. bilateral agreements, however, worked against one 

 major goal of Atoms for Peace. Because the agreements provided many ad- 

 vantages to the other countries, and because this web of agreements obtained for 

 the United States influence and leverage that it otherwise might not have had, 

 there has been a reluctance to shift the channel for U.S. technical assistance for 

 nuclear power in Europe and elsewhere, from country-to-country agreements to 

 the International Atomic Energy Agency. From a global viewpoint, it might be 

 seen that the United States and other world leaders in nuclear power are in com- 

 petition with the International Agency when they deal directly with other coun- 

 tries in supplying technical assistance. There is an implied balancing of advantages 

 to goals of individual nations versus the anticipated advantages of a strengthened 

 International Agency.'" 



Accordingly, Dr. Donnelly raises the question as to whether the time 

 is at hand for a reexamination of the relative roles of bilateral and 

 multilateral agreements. The bilateral approach lent itself to the 

 immediate and practical problems of a highly technical transaction 

 involving patents, safeguards, audit and inspection, and safety. 

 Nevertheless, said the author: 



Assuming that it is in the best interests of the United States and world peace 

 to see the Nonproliferation Treaty operate at full effectiveness, it may now be 

 time for the United States to reexamine the present roles of bilateral agreements 

 and of the International Agency as the means for furnishing future technical 

 assistance and incentives for nuclear power. Channeling more U.S. aid through 

 the IAEA could be expected to strengthen the agency. However, to deemphasize 

 the present network of bilateral agreements with individual nations and with 

 multinational bodies such as Euratom would lose for the United States the 

 benefits associated with direct dealings."^ 



One interesting development has been the negotiation of bilateral 

 agreements with multilateral organizations, viz., the International 

 Atornic Energy Agency and Euratom. These grew out of a deliberate 

 decision by the United States not to replace bilateral with muti- 

 lateral atomic dealings. Secretary Dulles had favored the multilateral 

 approach for three reasons: 



(1) Although the bilateral agreements included adequate provisions for safe- 

 guards, unless there was an international agreement on common standards, 

 future competition among supplying nations for the nuclear fuel market would 

 almost certainly erode the .safeguards of the bilateral agreements; 



(2) Nations with bilateral agreements with the United States for development 

 of nuclear power would not indefinitely accede to U.S. inspection of the nuclear 



3'0 Ibid., p. 174. 



3" Ibid., pp. 174-175. 



"2 Ibid., p. 175. 



