1747 



ib inversely proportional to the number of interested parties, perhaps 

 the designation of oceanic subregions and identification of claimants 

 to each might enable a fairer sharing by all. 



It is also likely that the reduction of seabed issues to a network 

 of bilateral altercations would be fraught with peril, exacerbating 

 tensions and conflict over sovereignties in question. 



On the other hand, shared efforts of a consortium of nations to 

 discover, and to develop a mutual ability to exploit, mutual wealth 

 seems as logical for a designated ocean region as for the Lower Mekong 

 Basin. 



CASE six: u.s.-soviet commercial relations 



Assessment of the security, political, economic, and technological 

 implications of the October 1972 commercial agreement between the 

 United States and the Soviet Union is the focus of this study. As 

 such, it is inherently a study of a single, highly important bilateral 

 relationship. 



As the study points out, this agreement was only one of many 

 vehicles for progress in relations between the two countries, others 

 being agreements on science and technology, nuclear weapons, space 

 cooperation, medical science, and the environment. The emphasis of 

 the study on the trade part of this series of bilateral agreements 

 enabled the placing of other bilateral elements in perspective. 



The intricate calculus of the slowly evolving detente between the 

 two "superstates," as presented in the study, shows the importance 

 as well as convenience of the bilateral approach in application. The 

 flawed management of the grain negotiations that accompanied the 

 broader agreement suggests that even when devised in isolation a 

 major bilateral initiative can overextend the skills of top U.S. 

 negotiators to achieve a workable diplomatic trade strategy. The 

 aftermath of the trade agreement, moreover, shows that U.S. diplomacy 

 can be frustrated if the executive branch assumes sole charge and 

 neglects the diplomatic role of the Congress. 



Undoubtedly the diplomatic problem was usefully simplified by 

 being managed bilaterally, while ignoring such obviously important 

 related elements as technological competition from other highly 

 developed states, the interests of other grain-exporting states, the 

 special case of the People's Republic of China, the interests of the 

 emerging "Third World," and the under-lying threat of further 

 nuclear proliferation. 



While the study, steadily bilateral in scope and limited to trade, 

 was evidently complex and far-ranging in its implications, there are at 

 least three reasons for enlarging this problem to a multilateral canvas: 



First, it became necessary to examine the political, economic, and 

 technological impacts — actual or potential — of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade 

 negotiations on many "third countries." 



Second, in the background and not taken into account is the ques- 

 tion of the gradual transition of the political world from a bipolar to a 

 multipolar character. 



Third, as events shice 1972 have shown, U.S. trade policy must 

 adapt flexibly to multiple markets and sources of suppl}'; it caruiot 

 safely be shaped too extensively by the special requirements of U.S.- 

 U.S.S.R. trade. (The rewards of such trade for the United States are 



