1765 



rising. U.S. exports must keep pace. But if — as seems possible— U.S. 

 "low technology" basic industries are beginning to lag technologically 

 behind like foreign industries, the United States appears to be con- 

 fronted with, the need to formidate a new strategy of technology. 

 The options would seem to include: 



— A greatly increased effort to identify and acquire techno- 

 logical improvements in basic industries from abroad ; 



" — A systematic effort to upgrade the technological level of 

 U.S. basic industries by support for related scientific research, 

 creation of well-funded applied research institutes in appropriate 

 fields, a closer coupling of industrial and academic research in 

 related sciences, and removal of barriers to innovation in the basic 

 industries.^°' 



THE SPECIAL CASE OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY 



One tangible advantage enjoyed by the United States in world food 

 and fiber trade is that for more than a century U.S. agriculture has 

 received governmental support for R. & D. and the dissemination of 

 research results. Although commonly regarded as belonging in the 

 "low technology" category, U.S. agriculture has accumulated a vast 

 reservoir of truly scientific information on all phases of crop produc- 

 tion, harvesting, preservation, processing, and marketing. In con- 

 sequence the United States is the leading exporter in the world of 

 agricultural commodities and is helping to feed both highly industrialized 

 and overpopulated developing nations abroad. But the allocation of 

 U.S. foods to those importing nations who need them raises its own 

 dilemma: man}^ such nations lack the resources to purchase U.S. 

 foods, and others are seeking to improve their teims of trade by raising 

 the prices of exports of raw materials. If the United States accepts 

 these increases in cost without also raising prices of food and other 

 exported goods, the U.S. trade balance suffers; if it raises the prices, 

 the U.S. consumer suffers and countries lacking the leverage of material 

 exports (e.g., petroleum) w^U go short. 



IMPORTANCE OF SELECTIVITY IN POLICYMAKING 



In general, then, it can^be suggested that different skills and 

 different analytical approaches are needed to deal with the diplomatic 

 policy aspects of high and low technology. The former relates more to 

 strategic weaponry, spectacular achievements and related national 

 prestige, and such global concerns as space telecommunications, 

 information storage and retrieval systems, Landsat, and weather 

 satellites. The latter relates more to the bread-and-butter concerns of 

 national economies, industrial employment, costs of living, and 

 international movement of materials and mass-produced products. 

 Government policy is influential in the development of high technolog}' 

 and in the international movement oi the injyuts and outimts of low 

 technology. 



«" These barriers are widely regarded in private industry as perliaps the most serious factor retarding U.S. 

 technological progress. A significant example of lagging U.S. low technology is the belated entry of this 

 country's auto industry into the small car market, thereby giving small imports a foothold quite unneces- 

 sarily. However, it is not evident that the principal barriers to this innovative direction were imposed on the 

 U.S. auto industry from outside its OMn domain. Undoubtedly, such external barriers to innovation do 

 exist, but whether they are more potent than self-imposed corporate obstacles to innovation is unlikely. 

 Probably the main barrier to innovation— as distinguished from invention— is shortage of investment capital. 



