1816 



the wellsprings of that resistance are still not understocd in this 

 country,*"^ it is obvious that a fierce spirit of independence was at 

 work. 



Instances of resistance to Western foods, however nutritions and 

 needed — such resistance constituting an obstacle to both normal trade 

 practices and extraordinary measures like famine relief- — have oc- 

 curred in Oriental, Arab, and other non-Western societies. This kind 

 of cultural barrier to rational interdependence arrangements usually 

 derives both from taste preferences formed out of deeply rooted 

 traditional practices and from historic religious beliefs. 



Longstanding French resistance to "Americanization" (of language, 

 TV programs, products, lifestyle in general) might serve as a relatively 

 sophisticated example of cultural resistance in the developed world. 

 Recently this posture has been mirrored by French and other 

 Canadians.*^^ 



It is not the intention here to denigrate cultural resistance to- 

 change.^®^ Cultural diversity is important to human civilization. 

 However, since cultural and psychological factors tend to support 

 independence and to work against interdependence, thej^ need to be 

 takeii'into consideration in any attempt to balance the two forces, 



■ • ' .,'(■ :-■■■■ 



V GROWTH VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS 



There are significant relationships between the two dichotomies of 

 growth versus environment and independence versus interdependence. 



A posture, pf independence may tend at certain stages in national' 

 development to favor growth. This is likely to be true for nations 

 relatively self-sufficient in resources, including requisite skilled and 

 unskilled manpower; the classic case is that of the United States 

 of the 19th century. It may also be true for nations with unbal- 

 anced resources but a great wealth of one highly essential commod- 

 ity — the obvious example is oil — which can command a premium price 

 in the world market if vigorously exploited. In both cases, the proc- 

 ess of iactive growth and more sophisticated development tends to 

 lead in time to a situation of interdependence as rising domestic 

 standards of living and the need for export markets amplify exchanges 

 with other nations. "Have-not" countries, however, are limited to 

 a choice between interdependence and continued poverty. 



Perhaps the process of growth leads to an ultimate condition of 

 global interdependence by three stages: (1) the exchange of materials 

 and services which nourish growth ; (2) the redistribution of the nega- 

 tive ecological impacts of growth; and (3) not yet at hand but foresee- 

 1 — • — ■ 



«» Margaret Mead testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 20, 1969, that "we 

 know nothing whatsoever about the North Vietnamese, because no research has ever be<>n done on the 

 subject . . ., nor do we know anything about the South Vietnamese." On the other hand, she said, "we 

 knew how the Japanese responded to liombing and how the Oermans responded to bombing. Those were 

 first-clasi pifeces of social science research done at the end of World War II which we totally disregarded when 

 we decided to go in and bomb Hanoi." (U.S. Congress, Senate. Psychological Aspects of Forngn Policy, 

 hearings "before the Committee oh Foreign Relations, June 5, 19, and 20, 1969.' Washington, U.S. Govt. 

 Print. Off., 1969, pages 96 and 118.) 



•" In the article referred to above— "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence"— Lincoln P. Bloomfield 

 writes; ''It is not simply the onc-si(ledness of U.S. 'investments in Canada that hais produced mounting 

 strain. Rather,' it is thetotallty of penetration in the social, cultural, and informational sectors. ..." 

 , «•« Cultural resistance of this kind may also deriye some support from technology-alienated elements in 

 developed countries who see uncontrolled, too rapid, or misdirected growth as destructive of human values. 

 Professor Robinson notes: "As John Dewey observed, the multiplication of points of contact may Kkewise 

 multiply points of friction. Thus, technology's incalculable impact upon the concourse of states may produce 

 the very opposites of cooperation and community"' 



