1874 



with decision levels. There was even question as to whether the con- 

 cept of a long-range planning unit for diplomacy was realistic. How- 

 ever, the conclusion of the study is that some form of concentrated 

 unit is essential, that it must have access to decision levels, must be 

 insulated from current tasks, and must be able to tap all essential 

 information sources. 



The study also suggests that a comparable source of long-range 

 planning — including both information and analysis in the diplomatic 

 area — -is needed by the Congress. The question was raised as to whether 

 the Congress "should rely mainly on policy studies and recommenda- 

 tions of the executive branch, or whether these sources should be 

 supplemented by information and analyses by competent authorities 

 directly and exclusively responsible to the Congress." ^" The study 

 observes "that the congressional resources for dealing today with the 

 great and complicated issues of science, technology, and American 

 diplomacy are widely diffused" and the "the need seems to exist for 

 some form of arrangement to bring to a focus, and into logical unity, 

 the diverse strands of diplomacy now being separately pursued by 

 perhaps a dozen committees of Congress." "* 



A View of Strengthened Mechanisms of Long-Range Planning 



At the invitation of the director and associate director of the Proj- 

 ect, Prof. Edgar A. Robinson of the American University undertook 

 an analysis and review of the study Science and Technology in the 

 Department of State. Extracts from his anal3^sis are presented in this 

 section. His particular interest was the enhancement of institutional 

 arrangements reflecting not only procedure but also the temper and 

 habit of mind of long-range planning, defined as the rational manage- 

 ment of irrational (i.e., undirected) events. He finds policy weaknesses 

 in short-range planning, which he describes as "Attendance to im- 

 mediate and imminent events with ensuing minimization of the 

 broad-scale determinants of these events," the result being "perpetua- 

 tion of crisis through serial short-range measures." He notes, also, 

 that what passes for long-range planning is too often built upon and 

 merely an extension of short-term techniques, with consequent 

 absence of consistency and continuity. 



Short-range planning [Robinson suggests] may . . . properly confine itself 

 to one country, episode, or isolated issue, whereas long-range planning may never 

 do so. Long-range planning need invariably be supranational and suprasituational 

 in configuration. . . . Short-range planning is concerned with constricted . . . 

 situations; long-range planning . . . with . . . the transformation of inter- 

 national afifairs along lines congenial to our national interest. . . . 



Perhaps it is not too much of an oversimplification to say that 

 short-range planning contrives adaptation to change whOe long-range 

 planning contrives and directs change itself. As Robinson puts it: 



... The first goal of long-range planning should be to forge perspective, 

 i.e., long-range criteria of well-functioning and malfunctioning ihterdepend- 

 ences. . . . Short-range planning . . . cannot deal with interdependence on 

 other than a superficial, transient basis . . . and the outcome is nothing less 

 than the yielding of human aspirations and needs to the mercies of historical 

 determinism in the worst import of the phrase. The supreme purpose of long-range 

 planning is to ensure that the ceaseless, inevitable interdependences of peoples 

 today will be articulated in a wise, civilized and logically warranted manner. 



"3 Ibid., p. 1500. 

 "< Ibid., p. 1503. 



