1882 



and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, in relation to 

 both sources of policy studies would be important. 



Precisely how the Council of International Planning proposed by the 

 Murphy Commission would serve in relation to these various other 

 planning organizations is not entirely clear. The Commission's idea 

 that it would address "a few carefully selected problems" on the 

 instruction of the President has a ring of the short-term planning 

 approach. The President is rarely free to think about problems and 

 opportunities a decade hence. The Council of Economic Advisers (on 

 which the CIP would be patterned) is limited by statute to short-range 

 problems. It is not clear what would be gained by adding another 

 mechanism for operational planning of diplomacy to those already 

 available, if that is indeed the intention. 



Some Further Thoughts on Foreign Policy Planning in the Legislative 

 Branch 

 The Murphy Commission in its section on planning addressed 

 mechanisms for the executive branch almost exclusively. Historically 

 the tendency has persisted to regard the President and the executive 

 branch as the primary locus of foreign policy and the custodian of 

 information on which the policy is based. As long as the President and 

 Congress are of the same political party, or as long as there is a tacit 

 agreement between the President and Congress that "politics stops 

 at the water's edge," congressional acquiescence in Presidential leader- 

 ship and direction of foreign policy may be no great issue. However, 

 when significant policy differences exist between the two branches, 

 a separate congressional role in the process of planning of foreign 

 policy may be demanded by the Legislature. There are a number of 

 reasons why such a planning instrument of its own might be desirable 

 and useful. For example, it could be made responsible for such services 

 as the following: 



The testing and evaluation of the President's structure of 

 foreign policy decisions; 



Determination of the alternative consequences of supporting, 

 or challenging, Presidential policy initiatives; 



Identification of important problems and opportunities that 

 the President may have neglected for reasons of policy or other- 

 wise that still warrant legislative consideration; 



Relating individual legislative actions to the long-range 

 directions of national policy for foreign relations; 



Evaluation of policy options offered bj^ the executive branch 

 that require legislation for their implementation; 



Evaluation of ongoing programs and operations of the diplo- 

 matic apparatus as to consistency with broader and long-range 

 national goals and priorities shared by the President and Congress; 

 Independent determination of the reasons for failures and short- 

 comings of policy decisionmaking by the executive branch; 



Assurance that the policy planning processes of the executive 



branch maintains a high quality of product and performance ; and 



Achievement of coherence in the sometimes fragmented items 



being separately offered as legislative proposals. 



It is also possible that the same dilemma would exist for the Congress 



as was encountered by the Murphy Commission in prescribing a 



planning mechanism for the executive branch; i.e., congressional as 



