Caelile. — On the Ultimate Problem of Philosophy . 81 



things endowed not only with some sort of Hfe, but also with 

 some sort of unconscious knowledge of each other's existence 

 and position. We have been accustomed in the past to make 

 use of the categories of the material world to express, as best 

 we can, the facts of mind. A tendency, however, is noticeable 

 in recent science to reverse tbe process. We speak naturally 

 now of the refracted light -ray as seeking the least circuitous 

 route to its goal that is in the circumstances possible to it. It 

 comes naturally, too, to Mr. Darwin to ask, with reference to a 

 reversion like the occasional appearance of the double uterus, 

 how could it "know," as it were, what course it had to follow, 

 unless we assume its connection by descent with some form in 

 which it was normal. 



Hence, even if we are old-fashioned enough to be desirous 

 of finding adequate reasons for believing intelligence to be the 

 guiding principle of the universe, we can look on with equa- 

 nimity at the Kantian criticism engaged in demolishing the 

 ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological arguments 

 for the being of a God. The very statement of such argu- 

 ments involves the conception of two subjects — nature and 

 God — the existence of the latter of which has to be proved 

 from qualities perceivable in the former. Let us conceive the 

 work to be thoroughly done, and the God of the old natural 

 theology to be extinguished. We are left alone then with 

 nature — with the totality of things, incltiding ourselves, as the 

 percipients of them all. This is, then, the one subject in the 

 universe ; and we are driven at once to ask. What are its pre- 

 dicates ? That one of them is life is a self-evident conclusion ; 

 and that others are organic unity, and in some sense the 

 manifestation of intelligence, are further conclusions which 

 every fresh discovery in science emphasizes. By the time we 

 have assimilated them , however, we find that the very fact of 

 getting rid of the God of the old natural theology has brought 

 us back many steps in the direction of a conception which, 

 after all, closely approximates to the conception of God in the 

 natural mind. So far, Hume would be' with us. With the 

 common- sense of English thought, which does not let its 

 theories run away with it, he allows his doctrine of causation 

 to go by the board, and does not hesitate to say that there 

 can never be any doubt as to the being of a God — the only 

 questions that can arise are questions in reference to his 

 nature. It is here, indeed, that the true difficulty begins. If 

 we can go no fm-ther in assigning predicates to the one great 

 subject than to affirm of it life, unity, and some sort of in- 

 telligence, there is much truth in Hume's contention that our 

 belief can never be the ground ' ' either of any action or of any 

 forbearance." It is plain that we can find these predicates in 

 no other manner than by casting our glance on the world 

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