258 



States should keep itself ahead in this important technological market 

 instead of helping other nations to become competitors. 305 



Sharing the U.S. Monopoly 



If other nations acquire their own enrichment capabilities, either 

 individually or through a multinational organization, there arises the 

 foreign policy question whether the United States should seek to in- 

 fluence such foreign ventures and, if so, by what means. 



While the European Economic Community has the ability to 

 develop and build enrichment plants, for these to have a reasonable 

 chance of economic success they must be economically competitive 

 with the United States and, possibly, the U.S.S.R. One major cost for 

 a European plant would be the duplicating of research, development, 

 and experience of the United States. That cost could be minimized 

 were the United States to supply the technical information, and per- 

 haps certain critical materials and components. In return for such 

 assistance, the United States would expect some voice in the organiza- 

 tion and its operations. A U.S. policy decision to supply its technology 

 could hasten the end of the American monopoly in enrichment serv- 

 ices and perhaps increase the risk of undesirable proliferation of the 

 world's capability to make nuclear weapons materials. 306 



The proffering of U.S. enrichment technology was broached before 

 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1969. Some members viewed 

 it as a way to reduce the scale of the future government commitment 

 to expand the AEC's production plants. Representative Craig 

 Hosmer was impatient with foreign complaints about the realibility 

 of the United States as a supplier of enriched uranium. He remarked 

 with some asperity that : 307 



I am personally sick and tired of hearing them complain about the un- 

 reliability of the United States. As far as I am concerned, I want to make it 

 clear I don't care who enriches this stuff. I think that the proliferation feature 

 can be taken care of. Where our danger exists is that a bunch of people are 

 going out and installing more capacity in an unrelated fashion to the existing 

 capacity and growing demand so that we reach the point where the demand 

 for enriched uranium goes down and we have a lot of unamortized plants on our 

 hands somewhere in the world, and I hope that they are in Europe and Japan. 



The following year, after some speculation in the newspapers that 

 the United States was planning to share enrichment technology 

 abroad. 308 Commissioner Johnson sooke about this possibility and indi- 

 cated the AEC would be open-minded to foreign inquiry. 309 



so" The hearing inouired Into the AEC's ability to meet future domestic and foreign com- 

 mitments. Of. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Author- 

 izina Lcaislation Fiscal Year 1972, 92d Coner., 1st Sees., 1971. part 4, p. 2238. 



3ns While the separation plantR themselves probably would not produce weapons grade 

 materials, the slightly enriched uranium they would produce would be n convenient feed 

 material for the clandestine manufacture of highly enrlcbed uranium for weapons. 



807 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings, Future Ownership of the 

 AEC's Oaseous Diffusion Plants, 91st Cone., 1st Sess.. 1969. p. 55. 



•""The Washington Post of October 23, 1970, carried a feature article about a plan to 

 share secret American nuclear technology with foreign countries as being recommended by 

 the AEC and the State Department. One major reason for the proposition was that at least 

 six other countries were on the verge of producing their own enriched uranium. The Wall 

 Street Journal of October 26. 1970, reported that the Administration was weighing an 

 AEC proposal that United States Interest* would benefit from the sharing of its uranium 

 enrichment technology with friendly nations. 



809 Wilfrid E. Johnson, "Uranium enrichment — U.S. Policy, Requirements and Capabili- 

 ties," AEC Press Release S-38-70, November 17, 1970. 



