80 



has attempted to put this question in perspective when he comments on 

 this possibility as follows : 



We still do not know how much the relatively short gap 

 between the first American and the first Russian explosion 

 was due to successes in Soviet espionage, and how much it 

 was due simply to native Russian capability. At the time it 

 seemed to many of us that espionage must have been far and 

 away the main reason they were able to accomplish the job so 

 quickly, especially after the devastation that had been 

 wreaked on them by World War II. Haying since seen some 

 excellent Russian technological progress in other fields, we are 

 no longer quite so sure that this was the case. We should note, 

 furthermore, that it is always easier to do something a second 

 time, even if the only thing known from the first time is that 

 it can be done. 49 



All things considered, an awareness of the progress of Soviet nuclear 



technology may contribute to an understanding in retrospect of the 



Soviet perceptions and attitudes during the negotiations of the 



UNAEC. 



The Form and Purposes of International Control 



The first question which arose in connection with the atomic energy 

 policy formulation in 1947 was whether the general form of control 

 should depend primarily on a system of international ownership and 

 management, or on a system which left atomic energy development in 

 national hands and relied on inspection to assure compliance with an 

 agreement not to develop atomic energy for military purposes. Few 

 specifics regarding the substantive aspects of this control issue were 

 offered in the early international political actions on the subject. The 

 resolution which established the UNAEC simply called on the pro- 

 posed Commission to make proposals for "effective safeguards" to in- 

 sure compliance with the control arrangement. Although it mentioned 

 inspection as one type of safeguard, it offered no commitment to a 

 particular method. 



PROPOSALS OF THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT 



The Hoard of Consultants' 1 position against inspection: The con- 

 cept of inspection was distasteful to the members <>!' the Hoard of Con- 

 sultants. The Hoard saw it as inherent in the leading alternative to 

 their own proposals: to leave atomic energy development in the hands 

 of individual nations while prohibiting its development for military 

 purposes would require inspection of national activities. Thus, inspec- 

 tion would be the sole means of verification of the control system, an 

 arrangement which t he ( lonsilltants opposed. 



The Hoard's position, as expressed in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, 

 was not based solely on technological considerations; it included "the 

 inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in 

 enforcing agreements between nations, each free to develop atomic 

 energy, but only pledged not to use it for bombs." " Nevertheless, the 

 argument against inspection in the report originated with the techno- 



'"Herberl York, Race to oblivion: A Participant's liar of the Arm* Race. (New York: 



Si d & Schuster, 1971 >, pp. 34 35. 



60 State I)t'i>iirtinent, "Acheson-Lilienthal report", p. 4. 



