555 



for high test metals, sophisticated machines, manpower, and other im- 

 portant inputs. Military leaders would thus appear to have an interest 

 in downgrading the priority for the Siberian projects. 



Significant progress could perhaps be made in critical military areas, 

 such as installation of MIRV warheads for the existing Soviet ICBM 

 inventory, without new construction of either silos or missiles. This 

 alone would tend to convert numerical advantage into a strategic ad- 

 vantage by offsetting the technological leadership of the United States. 

 In this special sense, it is conceivable that the Soviets could continue 

 to improve their strategic position and reorder priorities. However, 

 MIRV retrofitting may not be a low-cost operation, if the Soviet mili- 

 tary is not already well developed in this area. 



The potential competition between military projects and the West 

 Siberian development has a special time dimension to it. The longer 

 the Siberian development proceeds in time, the more compelling the 

 logic to allocate the necessary resources to bring it to full effectiveness. 

 If the development of new strategic systems, e.g., the SS-0, SS-11, 

 and SS-17 ICBMs, should involve a long, risky, and expensive proc- 

 ess — the gestation period for such systems is said to be 8-10 years— the 

 question would arise as to whether the two patterns of resource alloca- 

 tion could be simultaneously supported. If both military and civilian 

 projects were begun, at what point could overcommitment be per- 

 ceived and resources shifted to bring the effort having first priority to 

 timely completion? Vnderfunding and delay of both military and 

 civilian programs would not be an attractive prospect to the Party 

 or its leader. 



Moreover, if overcommitment should be permitted, it might be diffi- 

 cult, even technologically impossible, to shift resources from one pro- 

 gram to the other. The long completion times required for such 

 sophisticated military and civilian projects create both technological 

 and management problems in conversion, and the ability to shift re- 

 sources committed to these projects becomes increasingly limited over 

 time. 



Brezhnev may soon have to act decisively in order to avoid over- 

 commitment on two competitive, nonconvertible patterns of resource 

 allocation. If Brezhnev views the West Siberian development and the 

 deployment of SS-9 and SS-11 missiles as competitive patterns of 

 resource allocation, and if some relatively irreversible decisions on al- 

 locations are necessary, he may be inclined to divert resources from the 

 potential military program to bring to fruition the civilian invest- 

 ment project. At present, it appears that there may be a delay in the 

 program for further buildup of the SS-9 and SS-11. 53 Commitments 

 may not yet be made to a new round in strategic weapons buildup. On 

 the other hand, the West Siberian oil-gas complex appears to be moving 

 ahead, possibly with support from the military industries. 



Although oil and gas targets were not met in the 1972 Plan, and the 

 1973 Plan has scaled down targets, the West Siberian priority appears 

 intact. A four-day visit by Premier Kosygin to the Siberian oil and 

 gas fields in January 1973 may have been intended to give further evi- 

 dence of the leadership's support for the Siberian project. 54 



ra New York Times, Mar. 8, 1971, p. 1 and Mar. 27, 1971, p. 1. Some indications suggest 

 the MIRV-equipped SS-lls are being tested. New York Times, Oct. 9, 1972. 

 64 New York Times, Jan. 15, 1973. 



