276 



An even bigger potential loophole, critics contend, is the lack of any 

 inspection of the nuclear- weapon powers: China, France, the United 

 States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Without auditing 

 the use of the fissionable material they produce, much less the stock- 

 piles they have produced in the past, is there a way to be sure that they 

 are not secretly transferring fissionable material to non-nuclear coun- 

 tries ? In the view of some critics, only comprehensive inspection, per- 

 haps covering all exports from nuclear to non-nuclear countries, could 

 provide assurance against the illicit international transfer of nuclear 

 weapons of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. 



One student of the proliferation problem has questioned the whole 

 approach of the inspection system and believes that accounting for 

 nuclear fuels is an inadequate safeguard. He argues that what is 

 needed instead is a method of internationally acquiring, storing, and 

 guarding the plutonium produced by civil nuclear reactors. Leonard 

 Beaton, writing in Foreign Affairs in 1967, said : 345 



The proposed nonproliferation treaty must be judged primarily for its effect 

 on the growing threat of a worldwide diffusion of plutoniiun. If it reinforces 

 the false security of the safeguards system by persuading the legalists that no 

 country which has signed is ever capable of building nuclear weapons, it will 

 do a grave disservice to the cause of nonproliferation. It could provide the 

 cover under which the plutonium silently spreads, as it is now spreading to 

 Italy and India. Like a fine row of Georgian houses condemned to come down, 

 everything would be gradually let go. When the houses are finally bulldozed 

 away they have usually become so ramshackle that no one minds. Equally, under 

 the placid rule of safeguards as they are now understood, the plutonium will 

 spread for and wide. When the collapse comes, no one will remember how easy 

 it might have been to hold a narrow ring. 



Finally, critics point out, any nation can withdraw upon 3 

 months' notice. A nation could sign the Treaty but proceed secretly 

 as far as possible with all the plans for making nuclear weapons and, 

 whenever it felt ready, merely notify the other parties and the Secur- 

 ity Council of the United Nations that it was withdrawing. 



Some Congressional Doubts 



Although the Senate assented to the Treaty, and thus to the antici- 

 pated role of the International Agency in safeguards, there have l>een 

 some congressional doubts. For example, the House Committee on 

 Foreign Affairs during hearings in 19P>S heard pointed criticism and 

 a warning from a leading member of the Joint Committee on Atomic 

 Energy who questioned the enforceability of Article III. the ability 

 of the International Agency to carry out the safeguards function, and 

 the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the nego- 

 tiations. Representative Craig Hosmer said, in part. : 346 



. . . ACDA now comes up with the NPT article III which it claims provides 

 an enforcing mechanism in the form of inspection. This is a sad delusion made 

 a tragic one because it is self-induced by ACDA whose spokesman . . . actually 

 believe article III lias real teeth, when in truth and in fact, it has false teeth 

 for tlie fo'lowing reasons: 



A. Article TII only calls upon signatories to "undertake to accept safeguards 

 as set. forth in an agreement to I>e negotiated and included with the International 

 Atomic Energy Agency" and (hat such negotiations commence within ISO days 

 after the treaty goes into effect. This is no more than an "agreement to make 

 an agreement." No legal system recognizes as valid or enforceable any such 

 ambiguous present, promise to come to a future unspecified agreement. Article 



n4r ' l>r>nnrd Ronton. "Nurlenr Fu<>1 for-All," Foreign Affairs, vol. 45 (July, 19R7). p. fifiO. 

 849 U.S. Conpross. House, Cnmmlttpp on Forolpn Aff.iirs, Hearings, Arms Control and 

 Disarmament Aet Amendments, 196S, 90th Conp.. 2d Scss., 1968, p. 9fi. 



