272 



cated that nuclear material is present. Information about the inspec- 

 tors is to be given to the state before the inspection is made, and the 

 state may, if it wishes, object to an individual inspector and ask that 

 another be sent. Moreover, the state has the right to have inspectors 

 accompanied by its officials. 



NEGOTIATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS: THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS 



COMMITTEE 



In April 1970, the IAEA Board of Governors created a Safeguards 

 Committee to recommend the contents of draft safeguards agree- 

 ments. The Committee was open to all member states of the Agency, 

 whether Board members or not. This open membership was in recogni- 

 tion of the general interest in safeguards and the desire of many non- 

 weapons member nations to participate directly in formulating con- 

 tents of the safeguards agreements which they ultimately would be 

 asked to conclude. The Committee met intensively over many months 

 and issued three reports, covering all aspects of the proposed safe- 

 guards agreements. 337 With the approval by the Board of Governors 

 of the final report on April 20, 1971, the IAEA was ready to nego- 

 tiate and conclude all aspects of the necessary safeguards agreements 

 with parties to the Treaty. 



In defining the basic content of the agreement between the states 

 and the IAEA, the Safeguards Committee recommended a text similar 

 to that in the Nonproliferation Treaty itself. But whereas the Treaty 

 refers to the Agency's right and obligation to verify the prevention 

 of the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes, the Com- 

 mittee's document 338 limits the verification procedure to nuclear ma- 

 terials. This change should make the agreement more acceptable to 

 Euratom countries, for it shifts the emphasis away from facilities 

 and toward materials. 



SOME FACETS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 



Underlying the IAEA's guide for the structure and content of 

 safeguards agreements are two principles that deserve attention. 339 

 It called for (1) arrangements that would provide the Agency with 

 an effective means to detect the diversion of nuclear materials or to 

 identify unusual circum stances that warrant further investigation; 

 and (2) the fullest possible use of existing national systems of ac- 

 counting and control for nuclear materials, and the requirements that 

 their findings be verified by independent measures. 



**» Mr. Peter Kelly, a United Kingdom representative on the Board of Governors and 

 a participant in the Committee's work, gives some insight into the daily workings of 

 this group of nearly 50 very different delegations. Relating his experiences, he wrote: 



Quite early In our work a moderate, compromising spirit displayed itself in the 

 Committee. Then the atmosphere became friendly, at times even humorous. Instead 

 of confronting opposed views in the Board room, delegates took to talking them 

 over in the lounge, or in one or two nearby restaurants. In such environments, even 



tie i :i Intractable looking problems proved soluble : even the prickliest-looking 



delegate proved to have a human side, informal consultation came to count for 



more and more in our work: and when we got hack to the Hoard room even the 



Intractable problems had been one daren'1 say "fixed," but, perhaps, "adjusted.' 

 Cf. International Atomic Energu Igency Bulletin, vol. L3, No. •". (1971), p. 10. 

 338 IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and states 

 Required m Connection With the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 

 \. publication INFCIRC/153 (May 1971), 29 pages. 



The following diSCUSSion draws extensively upon a commentary liy Myron I?. Kratzer, 

 then Assistant General Manager for International Activities of the I'.S. Atomic Energy 

 Commission, in into national Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (11)71), 

 pp. 11 13. 



