230 



The United States also agreed to supply Euratom with 30 tons of 

 contained U-235. 283 Deferred payment was provided for the nuclear 

 fuel, and favorable conditions were also offered for the processing of 

 irradiated nuclear fuel and for the repurchase by the United States 

 of the plutonium produced. 234 Additionally, the U.S. Government 

 through the Export-Import Bank, extended long-term credit of $135 

 million to Euratom, which Euratom could in turn loan to partici- 

 pants in its power reactor program. Finally, the U.S. Government 

 recognized Euratom's value as an organ of inspection by conceding 

 to it the right of control over fissionable materials supplied by the 

 United States. Until then, in other bilateral agreements the United 

 States had directly exercised such control. , ' u 



THE JOINT BOARDS : AN ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 



One problehi for American diplomacy was to arrange some form 

 of organization which would permit a joint program to go forward 

 while retaining substantial control over U.S. funds. The climate of 

 the late 1950's did not favor the supplying by the United States of 

 unrestricted funds to Euratom. The solution Was to form two joint 

 boards wherein the United States and Euratom each controlled their 

 own funds, rather than putting them into a common pool. 



A Joint Reactor Board was established to examine proposals sub- 

 mitted for the construction of power reactors and to report its rec- 

 ommendations to the Euratom Commission and to the AEC. The 

 Board was presided over by a chairman from Euratom 235 and a vice- 

 chairman from the United States 236 with voting rights, and an equal 

 number of Euratom and American experts without voting rights. 



A Joint Research and Development Board, similarly organized, 

 was established to examine proposals for research, and to recommend 

 action to Euratom and to the AEC. 237 Despite administrative com- 

 plications, it appears that the joint boards functioned satisfactorily, 

 thanks to the cooperative and cordial attitude on both sides. 238 



A NOTE ON THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 



The bilateral agreement was negotiated in an atmosphere of con- 

 cern in Europe as to the possible consequences of the Suez crisis and 

 at a time when nuclear power was expected to offer early competition 

 with conventional sources of energy. But once the initial upsurge of 

 enthusiasm for the joint programs had slackened, and after the situa- 

 tion for conventional power supply in Europe had returned to normal, 

 there were observers who thought the Agreement had overreached 

 itself in favor of industry, while at the same time being too limited 

 for research. These considerations were to spark criticisms in Europe 

 that the Agreement had subordinated Euratom to U.S. domestic policy 

 and had invested Euratom with excessive powers." 36 



*« Of this 29 tons was for the power reactor program for fuel, and 1 ton for research 

 add development. I 



»*In comparison, for the period 1958 through 1961, the United States* commitment 

 to supply uranium under Atoms for Peace was a total of 50 tons of Uranlum-235. 



*« Eurn tom'8 Director General for Industry and Economy. 



288 The head of the nuclear section of the U.S. Mission to the Communities. 



*" Eum torn s Director General for Research and Training, and the Head of the Nuclear 

 Section of the U.S. Mission to the Communities. 



m Consolo, op. cit. p. 3. 



■• Ibid., p. 4. 



