201 



of these materials into fuel elements for nuclear power plants. Also 

 in 1968, the Treaty for Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was 

 opened for signature. Under Article III of the Treaty, IAEA would 

 be called upon to provide assurance that nuclear energy programs in 

 non-nuclear-weapons states adhering to the Treaty were not diverted 

 to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 

 devices. To support IAEA safeguards, the AEC provided the services 

 of technical experts, shared results of its research and development, 

 and provided safeguards training opportunities for the Agency's 

 staff. 168 



On March 5, 1970, the Nonproliferation Treaty entered into 

 force. In keeping with Article III which required each non-weapons 

 state to accept safeguards by agreement with the International Agency, 

 representatives of the United States and 47 other IAEA member 

 states, including the nuclear power states of Europe, met twice 

 during 1970 to consider the character of such safeguards agreements, 

 the procedures to be included, and the methods of financing the 

 safeguards. 



The "Four Reactor Agreement" of the United States expired on 

 July 31, 1970. To continue its cooperation with the IAEA in develop- 

 ing effective safeguards, the United States arranged for IAEA 

 personnel to take part in safeguards exercises at certain U.S. facilities. 

 This was intended as an interim arrangement until such time as 

 President Johnson's offer of 1967 to submit all U.S. peaceful nuclear 

 activities to IAEA safeguards was implemented. 169 



In December 1970, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in its 

 annual report noted that members and staff of the Committee had 

 visited the International Agency to discuss safeguard inspection pro- 

 cedures. The Joint Committee reported that it was mindful of the 

 importance of safeguards, ". . . but is looking very cautiously at the 

 growing safeguards program and what could develop into a need for 

 increased funding to support the numbers of personnel which may be 

 suggested as necessary to run the IAEA safeguards program." 17 ° 



However, the Joint Committee's report for 1971 had little to say 

 about safeguards. 



Conclusions and Current Issues 



Had the International Atomic Energy Agency evolved in the di- 

 rection indicated by President Eisenhower's idealistic Atoms for 

 Peace proposal, it could have had a major influence upon develop- 

 ment of commercial nuclear energy in Europe as a channel for 

 technical assistance and nuclear materials. However, the tensions of 

 the cold war effectively precluded such a role. While the United 

 States was the most generous contributor to the IAEA, it chose not 

 to promote the Agency as a distributor of nuclear materials or the 

 custodian of a pool of such materials. Nor did the United States 

 support an international regulatory or standard-setting function for 

 the IAEA for design and operation of nuclear power plants. On the 



1W U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 

 Commission for 1968 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969>, p. 204. 



199 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy 

 Commission for 1970 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1973, p. 129. 



170 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. "Activity and Accomplishments 

 of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy During the Second Session of the 91st Congress," 

 Congressional Record, vol. lltf, December 31, 1970, p. 44324. 



