259 



Early in January 1971, Representative Hosmer enumerated the 

 advantages to the United States of a European diffusion plant based 

 upon U.S. technology. These were : 310 



United States is relieved from financing this increment of enrichment capacity. 



United State.s conserves its irreplaceable energy fuels. 



United States stands to receive royalty income. 



All parties gain more time for centrifuge R. & D. 



Slowdown of centrifuge development postpones its possible contributions to- 

 ward proliferation. 



A cooperative international pattern is established for dovetailing enrichment 

 capacity to enrichment requirements. 



Precedent may be created for effective IAEA controls over enriched uranium. 



Other countries are relieved from dependence on the United States for uranium 

 enrichment services. 



If the deadline for decision is missed, Mr. Hosmer cautioned, these 

 advantages will be lost and the United States and other countries will 

 be forced to make other arrangements for post-1980 enrichment 

 capacity. 



In his second foreign policy message to Congress on February 25, 

 1971, President Nixon called attention to U.S. preeminence in technol- 

 ogy and posed the policy question : How far should the United States 

 share the fruits of its research and technology ? Taking nuclear energy 

 as an example, he announced that the administration had undertaken 

 consultations with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning 

 ways in which the United States could assist its allies to construct a 

 multinational uranium enrichment plant. 311 



In a separate statement of U.S. foreign policy for a technological 

 age, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, restated the question of 

 whether the United States, with adequate safeguards, should offer 

 to share uranium enrichment technology with other nations. He 

 said : 312 



The current situation with respect to enriched uranium fuels offers signifi- 

 cant opportunities for furthering international cooperation in the peaceful 

 uses of nuclear energy. Because of its advanced technology and plant capacity 

 the United States has been in effect the only exporter of enriched uranium fuel 

 for power reactors. Indeed, our export earnings from sales of nuclear power 

 plants, fuels, and related services are over $1 billion now and are expected to 

 reach $5 billion by 1975. 



But worldwide demand for this fuel continues to grow, and it is clear that other 

 nations intend to diversify their sources of supply. But we are now considering 

 whether, with adequate safeguards, we should offer to share our uranium 

 enrichment technology with other nations building a civil industry. 



Going further, Secretary Rogers saw the sharing of uranium enrich- 

 ment technology as an example of opportunities open for scientific 

 cooperation when political cooperation may not be feasible : 313 



Because the problems dealt with by science usually have a low specific gravity 

 in political terms, scientific cooperation is often possible where political co- 

 operation is not. 



The habit of cooperation is a good one to keep. If it is kept, it surely will have 

 spillover effect in increasing the constructive role of international organizations 



310 Remarks of Congressman Craig Hosmer, Congressional Record, vol. 116, January 2. 

 1971, n. 44805. 



311 "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s : Building for Peace," Weekly Compila- 

 tion of Presidential Documents, vol. 7 (March 1, 1971), p. 374. 



812 Cf. William P. Rogers, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Technological Age." An address 

 by . . . Department of State publication 8571, General Foreign Policy Series 252 (March 

 1971), p. 11-12. 



313 Loc. cit. 



