554 



The progress of the SALT talks could also have a negative influence : 

 i.e., failure of the talks would strengthen the influence of those resist- 

 ing change, even if Brezhnev should decide to change priorities. It is 

 important to assess whether Brezhnev was influenced by the interpre- 

 tations placed on the Interim Agreement by members of Congress who 

 insisted on future parity in the number of strategic weapons as a pre- 

 condition for SALT and for a comprehensive agreement on offensive 

 weapons. The Soviet press has been critical of congressional reserva- 

 tions on the SALT agreements. It was also critical of Secretary of De- 

 fense Melvin Laird's view that an acceleration of certain weapons sys- 

 tems development was necessary to assure parity and stability. This 

 critical reaction points to some uncertainty among Soviet leaders on 

 future military spending. 



History has provided two scenarios which suggest alternative 

 courses for the present Soviet leadership — one in 1956 which led to a 

 reduction in the emphasis on defense, and one in 1962, an upgrading of 

 the defense priority. In 1956 Nikita Khrushchev, Minister of Defense 

 Zhukov, and the Party leadership agreed to reduce military manpower 

 and modernize the Soviet armed forces. The stimulus to economic 

 growth from the release of resources was a factor in the continued 

 high growth rates and may have led Khrushchev subsequently to 

 promise to overtake and surpass the United States. It was only later, 

 after the first Kennedy budget and the Cuban missile crisis, that 

 Khrushchev apparently reversed these priorities, initiating the buildup 

 of some of the weapons now deployed by the Soviet Union and tem- 

 porarily stopping the progress of military manpower reduction. This 

 reversal and the concurrent, and possibly resultant, poor economic per- 

 formance may have been a factor in Khrushchev's removal from power. 



The interrelationship of political and economic variables in these 

 two scenarios may be relevant to the current scene. Leonid Brezhnev 

 is certainly no Khrushchev in power or personality, but the political 

 context in which he perceives himself may influence his interpretation 

 of economic alternatives, as an earlier political context influenced 

 Khrushchev. Is Brezhnev emulating the Khrushchev of 1956 or the one 

 of 1962? Some evidence suggests the 1956 scenario: (1) the apparent 

 commitment of a very high priority to the West Siberian development ; 

 and (2) repeated evidence that Western technology is highly valued 

 and required for completion of civilian programs. 



The Soviet leadership's policy in the West Siberian development 

 best illustrates how military and civilian claimants may be competing 

 for scarce investment funds. The explicit Party and Government direc- 

 tive of January 1970 on the West Siberian development called for co- 

 ordination of many Ministries, including the Ministry of Dcfen.se In- 

 dustries (a rare public reference), to bring about the expeditious com- 

 pletion of the regional development. r>1 Moreover, the number of proj- 

 ects related to the West Siberian development specifically mentioned 

 in the Plan Directives suggests continuing high priority consideration 

 in 1972. In the Ninth Five- Year Plan a good portion of the identified, 

 large projects are directly related to the West Siberian complex." To 

 have effective priority, the particular new claims of the Siberian proj- 

 ects would appear to be competitive with military hardware output 



51 Pravda, Jan. 15, 1970, p. 1. 



83 Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 6 (June 1971), p. 3 ; Pravda, Apr. 11, 1971. 



