269 



It will require all noninuclear parties to accept international safeguard? on 

 nil peaceful nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction, 

 or carried out under their control anywhere. 



It will help insure cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 

 and the exchange of scientific and technological information on such peaceful 

 applications. 



It will enable all countries to assist non-nuclear parties to the treaty with their 

 peaceful nuclear activities, confident that their assistance will hot he diverted 

 to the making of nuclear^weapons. x ' 



It obligates the nuclear- weapon parties to make potential benefits from any 

 peaceful applications of nuclear explosions available— oh a non-discriminatory 

 basis, and at the lowest possible cost— *o parties to the treaty that are. required 

 to give up the right, to have their own nuclear explosives. 



The next day the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations opened 

 hearings on the Treaty. 'On September 17 the committee- voted 13 to 

 3, with three abstentions, to recommend ratification. However, the 

 Senate did not act before adjournment and President Johnson's term 

 of office ended with the Treaty not yet approved. President Nixon on 

 February 5, 1969 sent a special message to the Senate recommending 

 its approval. In it, he reendorsed the previous commitment that the 

 United States would permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all 

 peaceful nuclear activities in the United States. Also he repeated U.S. 

 willingness to join with all Treaty parties to insure that the potential 

 benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be 

 made available to non-nuclear- weapon parties. 331 



Brief additional hearings were quickly held by the Senate Foreign 

 Relations Committee 332 and the Senate gave its advice and consent 

 on March 13, 1969. The Treaty was ratified at Washington on Novem- 

 ber 24, 1969, and the instrument of ratification was deposited on 

 March 5, 1970, at which time the Treaty entered into force. 



U.S. Support for Safeguards 



The commitment of the non-weapons nations to open their nuclear 

 activities to international safeguards is a notable innovation in inter- 

 national relations. Arriving at this commitment was a major feat 

 of international diplomacy. In testimony before the Senate Foreign 

 Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dean Rusk recounted some 

 of the difficulties. The problem which had most complicated the nego- 

 tiations arose out of the existence of two international safeguards sys- 

 tems : those of IAEA and of Euratom. It has always been U.S. policy 

 to work toward a single, worldwide system of safeguards. However, 

 the Common Market countries were reluctant to allow the IAEA 

 safeguards system to operate in their countries for fear that this ar-. 

 rangement would lead to abandonment of Euratom with unfavorable 

 effects on progress toward European unity. As a result, the United 

 States in its negotiations had to seek accommodation for both systems. 

 But this was contrary to the interests of the U.S.S.R. The" Soviet 

 Union was agreeable to mandatory safeguards requirements for the 

 non-weapons signatories of the treaty, but held that those safeguards 

 should be administered by the IAEA. The U.S.S.R. was a member 

 of the IAEA but not of Euratom. From the outset of the negotia- 

 tions, the Soviets had opposed accepting Euratom safeguards as a 

 substitute for those of IAEA on the ground that this alternative 

 amounted to self -inspection by Euratom members. 



fV'^ clear Nonproliferation Treaty," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 

 vol. 5 (February 10. 1969), p. 219. 



^U.S Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nonproliferation 

 Treaty, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969 part 2. 



