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not assure the impetus needed to reach the desired goals. The negoti- 

 ators did not produce a truly joint undertaking, but rather two paral- 

 lel, closely coordinated programs in which each party controls its 

 own funds. 



The diplomatic effort did produce several working nuclear power 

 plants in Europe that demonstrated U.S. nuclear technology both for 

 European and domestic U.S. nuclear markets. The joint programs 

 did provide experience in the operation of joint boards, experience 

 that could be useful for future multinational ventures. It may be 

 worth inquiring how much of this experience has been recorded and 

 analyzed for future reference. 



The diplomatic effort of organizing the joint programs did bene- 

 fit the US. nuclear industry, which had the opportunity to build 

 several more working power plants than would otherwise have been 

 possible. On the other hand, the prqgram never measured up to the 

 initial expectations and suffered from long delays.. 



As the United States moves into the mid-19 <0's in the face of grow- 

 ing national and international imbalances in supply and demand for 

 energy, it maj wejll^e useful to inquire what can be learned from 

 the joint programs. There, was a working together of government 

 agencies, universities, and industrial organizations in several countries 

 and useful 'research wa,s perfprjned. Perhaps the experience with the 

 joint programs could point the way toward future ventures to de- 

 velop new energy sources, such as large-scale use of solar energy, or 

 toward conservation of energy through expedited development of 

 nifignei;6h^dt6^yh4irii6'§ (JlffiD), Both the strengths and weaknesses 

 of the Euratom venture could he, instructive in planning such new de- 

 velopments on an international basis. 



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