271 



the IAEA either individually or together with other states. This latter 

 provision could enable Euratom member nations, for example, to 

 work out group arrangements for Euratom. 



Safeguards are not mandatory for parties who already possess 

 nuclear weapons. This situation was upsetting to many non- weapons 

 states during negotiations, but ultimately the distinction was accepted. 



Chairman Seaborg of the AEC, in supporting the Treaty, men- 

 tioned the concerns expressed by several countries that the application 

 of IAEA safeguards might place the non-weapon states at a commer- 

 cial disadvantage by compromising their commercial secrets or by 

 interfering with the operation of the facilities. He called these fears 

 groundless and explained : 334 



Agency inspectors are precluded from interfering in plant operations and they 

 normally require access only to information that is not commercially sensitive. 

 Nevertheless they are barred from transmitting any information that they 

 receive to unauthorized parties and any state has the right to declare a proposed 

 Agency inspector unacceptable. 



Negotiation of safeguards agreements was to begin within 180 days 

 from the original entry into force of the Treaty. 



To date, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved safeguards 

 agreements with three states : Austria, Finland, and Uruguay. More 

 approvals are expected at coming meetings of the Board. 



ELEMENTS OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM 



The IAEA safeguards system under the Treaty is based on four 

 main elements to be incorporated into individual safeguards agree- 

 ments during negotiations : 



( 1 ) A review of the design of nuclear facilities ; 



(2) Specification of a system of facility records and accounts; 



(3) Specification of a system of facility reports; and 



(4) Inspections of safeguarded nuclear facilities to verify 

 compliance with the safeguards agreement. 



The design review, based on information given to the Agency by the 

 state or obtained by initial inspections, is to ensure that each facility 

 will permit the effective applications of safeguards. The review will 

 also be used to determine the material balance areas 335 and to select 

 those "strategic points" 336 which will be used for measuring nuclear 

 material flows and inventories. 



Agency inspectors will be sent into states to audit records and 

 reports ; to verify the information in the records and reports by physi- 

 cal inspection, independent measurements, and sampling; and to ex- 

 amine facilities to check on measuring equipment and operations 

 carried out. The frequency and duration of IAEA inspections are to 

 be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation 

 of the safeguards procedures. The inspectors are expected to carry 

 out their duties in a way which will avoid hampering the operation 

 of nuclear facilities or the technological development of a nation's 

 nuclear industry. However, the Agency's inspectors must be given 

 access to any location where earlier reports and inspections have indi- 



331 Ibid., p. 100. 



335 A materials balance area Is an area within which the accounts for nuclear materials 

 entering, leaving, and stored must be kept In balance. 



336 For a discussion of "strategic points" see page 144. 



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