85 



development and competition among nations and private industry. 

 Moreover, active national participation in atomic energy development, 

 they hoped, would "help correct any tendencies that might otherwise 

 develop toward bureaucratic inbreeding and over-centralization, and 

 aid in providing healthy, expanding national and private develop- 

 ments in atomic energy." 62 



Although the Board contended that the technological factors associ- 

 ated with denatured materials lent credence to their expectations for 

 national activities, they warned that : 



Although as the art now stands denatured materials are 

 unsuitable for bomb manufacture, developments which do 

 not appear to be in principle impossible might alter the 

 situation.'"' 3 



During Administration deliberations before the opening of the 

 UNAEC, Baruch said denaturing had inspired false hopes, and in his 

 initial address to the UNAEC he stated that "Denaturing seems 

 to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.'' G4 

 Both the first and second reports of the UNAEC granted the 

 possibility of permitting national activity using denaturing mate- 

 rials only if the denaturing process proved technologically feasible. 

 This skepticism of the reliability of denaturing, as well as Soviet op- 

 position to proposals for international ownership and inspection, ap- 

 pear to have been responsible for the fact that the proposed reliance 

 on denaturing did not become a major issue in the negotiations. In 

 retrospect, the U.S. position on denaturing appears to have been 

 based upon a technology forecast — the assumption of a principle which 

 today, 25 years later, has remained undemonstrated in practice. This 

 fact points up one occasion when forecasts by scientific advisors would 

 not have met the needs of the diplomats. 



Inspection jrrovisions in the report : Despite the number of nega- 

 tive aspects of inspection, the Board members pointed out that the 

 need for it could not be eliminated entirely. However, the overall plan 

 they recommended was aimed at making inspection "so limited and 

 so simplified that it would be practical and could aid in accomplishing 

 the purposes of security." 65 The requirements for inspection are dis- 

 cussed in detail among the functions of the proposed international 

 Authority. 



The discussion of the issue tended to emphasize that inspection could 

 be beneficial. Because inspectors would also be engaged in research 

 on atomic energy , GC their "policing" of national facilities (for example, 

 those using denatured materials) would offer opportunities to provide 

 helpful guidance and advice to the operators of those facilities, mak- 

 ing inspection less objectionable. The only "systematic or large-scale 

 inspection activities" contemplated for the proposed Authority were 

 those which would be used to take control over raw materials. 67 In 

 addition, the report recognized that some procedure would have to be 

 devised for the investigation of suspected clandestine dangerous activ- 



82 Ibid., p. 22. 



83 Ibid., p. 23. 



64 Baruch, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," p. 1061. 



65 State Department, "Acheson-Lilienthal report," p. 5. 



98 The inspectors of tlie International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today do not reflect 

 this concept of the scientist-inspector. Rather, present-day inspectors are precisely that, 

 professional men in the complicated and uncertain art of nuclear materials. 



87 Contemporary inspection is focused more on processing, fabrication, use. and reproc- 

 essing of nuclear fuel materials than upon mining and refining. 



