553 



Brezhnev's past record. During the period preceding the announce- 

 ment of the Plan (i.e., 1969-1971), Brezhnev voiced his displeasure 

 over the performance of the economy, but committed himself firmly 

 to neither a reform of planning and management, nor a new set of 

 priorities. Indeed, he advocated a variety of programs in the pre- 

 Congress period. He favored the military in a speech at the Dvina 

 River Maneuvers in February 1970; he favored agricultural invest- 

 ment in the July 1970 Party Plenum and at the meeting of the Col- 

 lective Farmers (Kolkhozniki) Congress; he apparently approved a 

 call for more housing in a February 1971 revision of the Plan; and he 

 identified himself with technological change by personally signing the 

 Plan Directives that same month. Finally, he approved the publica- 

 tion of the Ninth Five- Year Plan, under the editorship of his State 

 Planning Committee Chairman, N. K. Baibakov, in April 1972. In 

 short, on the allocation of resources, he behaved like a politician who 

 was securing his position by supporting everyone's programs. But the 

 grim fact faced by all politicians, whether the President of the United 

 States or the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, is that choice 

 is the inexorable requirement of political economy. Especially when 

 growth is slow, a leader must be against some programs to be for 

 others. Specifically, there was no indication that the high military 

 priority of the 1960's was being scaled down as it had been by 

 Khrushchev in 1959. 



If expensive development of weapons systems is to continue, the 

 level of military claims on resources will then be at least equal to past 

 levels and will probably require a large share of the new resources 

 generated by modest economic growth. Unless military spending is 

 curtailed, increased requirements for modernization and consumer im- 

 provement must lead to overcommitment in the Ninth Five- Year Plan. 

 Brezhnev's dilemma illustrates that the two central economic policy 

 issues in Soviet politics remain civilian investment versus military 

 output, and the question of changes in planning and management. 



In view of Brezhnev's equivocation on economic issues in the past, 

 why should he be expected to pursue the politically risky changes in 

 economic policy projected by the Ninth Five- Year Plan ? A possible 

 answer is that Brezhnev for the first time is able and willing to con- 

 vince conservative Party interests to permit such change. The Gen- 

 eral Secretary appears to have emerged from the 24th Party Congress 

 with more power and responsibility than he enjoyed in the pre- 

 Congress Brezhnev-Kosygin collegial leadership. 50 At the same time, 

 Brezhnev's future tenure in office and position of power are likely to 

 depend to a large extent on economic performance. Thus, there is a 

 more persuasive post-Congress logic for Brezhnev to make firm deci- 

 sions and reasonable commitments that he judges will facilitate im- 

 proved economic performance. A stronger power base might enable 

 Brezhnev to overcome Party conservatives who oppose economic 

 change and to resist greater military outlays to compete with the 

 United States, to meet the Chinese threat, and to exploit the oppor- 

 tunities of Middle Eastern instability. A decision to change priorities 

 would be reinforced by success in the SALT talks, by possible Euro- 

 pean troop cuts, and by other post-Summit developments. 



^ »T e } l3 ^ on Ru8h . "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue," Problems of Communism, vol. 

 XX, No. 4 (July-August 1971), pp. 9-15. 



