63 



Declaration, a Soviet-Anglo-American statement. In addition to sup- 

 porting the idea of establishing a Commission in the United Nations, 

 the Moscow Declaration contained the text of a proposed resolution 

 to establish the organization, and invited Fiance, China, and Canada 

 to cosponsor it at the first session of the U.N. General Assembly in 

 January 1946.° The text of the Moscow Declaration was incorporated 

 unchanged in a resolution which was passed by the General Assembly 

 without a dissenting vote on January 24, 1946, and which thereby es- 

 tablished the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) . 

 Under the terms of the resolution, the UNAEC was to operate 

 closely within the framework of the Security Council, with its provi- 

 sion for the veto power, a fact with significance for subsequent nego- 

 tiations on the control of atomic energy. The Commission was to be 

 composed of one representative of each country on the Security Coun- 

 cil and receive directions from the Council "in matters affecting secu- 

 rity." The resolution added, "On these matters, the Commission shall 

 be accountable for its work to the Security Council," a provision which 

 was included as a result of the initiative of the Soviet Union at the 

 Moscow Conference. The rationale behind this approach rested on the 

 assertion that the most important aspect of the control question was 

 the assurance of security. Even at this early stage, the concern over 

 the military applications of atomic energy dominated the discussions, 

 diverting attention from ways to share knowledge necessary in the 

 economic or industrial applications of atomic energy. 7 The resolution 

 also set down the terms of reference for the Commission's proposals 

 as follows : 



(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of 

 basic scientific information for peaceful ends; 



(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary 

 to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes ; 



(c) For the elimination from national armaments of 

 atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable 

 to mass destruction ; and 



(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and 

 other means to protect complying States against the hazards 

 of violations and evasion. 8 



Formulation of Atomic Policy in the United States 



The commanding position of the United States as a world power 

 resulting from its role in World War II and in helping to shape the 

 postwar world led to an unprecedented involvement in international 

 relations. As the nation in sole possession of atomic weapons, the 

 United States bore an added responsibility to seek international con- 

 trol over this new and terrible form of destruction. 



Not onlv was it necessary to define national policv on international 

 control, but it was also important to determine an appropriate means 

 of domestic control, a responsibility which had been given to the Army 



6 See Ibid. pn. 125-127 for the text of the Moscow Declaration. 



7 Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, The Struggle to Control Atomic 

 Weapons, 191,5-1,9 (Boston, Mass. : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 213. 



8 "Establishment of a Commission to Deal With The Problems Raised by the Discovery 

 of Atomic Energy," United Nations General Assembly Resolution I, Resolutions Adopted b?/ 

 the General Assembly During the First Part of Its First Session from 10 January to 11, 

 February 191,6, United Nations Document A/64 (London, England: Church House, 1946), 

 p. 9. 



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