556 



Another problem area in the Soviet leadership's dilemma over re- 

 source allocation is the chronic manpower shortage in the Soviet econ- 

 omy. Although only limited information is available, the Plan direc- 

 tives indicate the severity of the problem. Increased labor productivity 

 is planned to account for 87-00 percent of the total increment in out- 

 put during the Ninth Five-Year Plan. While the total labor force is 

 to increase at an annual rate of 1.7 percent, the key industrial force is 

 stipulated to grow by only one percent. This modest increase in the 

 industrial labor force is about one-third the rate realized during the 

 Eighth Five- Year Plan (1.0 percent as compared to 2.8 percent). In 

 the past, overambitious plans for increased labor productivity were 

 offset by highe»'-than-planned expansion of the industrial labor force 

 at the expense of "buffer" sectors such as agriculture and services. 

 However, shifts from low priority sectors are becoming more difficult. 

 As noted by Murray Feshbach of the Commerce Department, "in most 

 years prior to the 1960's the planned number of workers and employ- 

 ees was met, and in industry the actual number frequently was 200,000- 

 300,000 persons above the plan. In 1965, however, the actual number 

 for industry was barely 25,000 above the plan, and by 1967 there was 

 a shortage of 125,000 industrial-production personnel relative to plan 

 requirements.'' 55 This fact graphically measures the end of "buffer" 

 sectors to cover shortfalls in industry manpower needs. 



At present, not only is labor unlikely to be released from other sec- 

 tors to meet industrial needs, but in the current Plan, income, invest- 

 ment, and administrative policy are designed to keep skilled workers in 

 agriculture from migrating to urban industrial jobs. Nonetheless, 90 

 percent of the high school graduates from rural schools still seek ur- 

 ban employment. 50 Shortfalls in ,the improvement in labor produc- 

 tivity are likely to aggravate the labor shortage. While labor produc- 

 tivity was scheduled to rise by 6.1 percent in 1972, it grew by only 5.2 

 percent/' 7 Improvement in labor productivity may turn on technolog- 

 ical change in output — better energy and equipment — and such im- 

 proved managerial techniques as the Shchekino experiment and the 

 agricultural zveno. 58 



Demobilization of some 3 million members of the armed forces in the 

 late 1950's (from 5.S to 3.0 million in the period 1955-1961) eased 

 Khrushchev's labor problem and coincided with rather good years of 

 economic performance. 59 Although the reduction in military manpower 

 may have been facilitated by technological modernization of the mili- 

 tary forces and a reduction of such missions as the withdrawal from 

 Austria, it may provide a precedent for current Soviet policy. Again, 

 at a time when manpower deficiencies are becoming more serious, no 

 ready major source of labor — ('specially young males to meet civilian 

 needs — is available other than the military forces. Military demobiliza- 

 tion would probably be stoutly resisted but not necessarily with suc- 



63 Murray Feshbnoh. Manpower Trrtuls in the T T RS!R ( Washington, D.C. : Department of 

 Commerce, Bureau of Economic Annlvsis, Mnv 1071) pp. 1, 18. 



M Tb!d., p. 12. 



BT TzveaUya, .Inn. 30. 1073. p. 1. 



^ Tho Shchekino experiment provides a sot of Incentives which oneourase tho enterprise 

 to fulfill its plan without Increasing employment or by reducing It. At the 24tli Tarty Con- 

 cress. Brezhnev specifically endorsed the Shchekino experiment. Tin' zveno provides a con- 

 tinuous relationship of the work unit and tlie common plot — a partial property rijrht. 



John Godaire. "The Claim of the Soviet Military Establishment." T'.s. Congress. 

 Joint Economic Committee, Dimcnxions of Soviet Economic Power, S7th Cong., 2d sess.. 

 1962. p. 43. 



