65 



control. For example, an argument in the United States which favored 

 complete civilian control had been the assertion that a military-con- 

 trolled program might convey the impression that the general purpose 

 of U.S. atomic energy programs was oriented toward weapons pro- 

 duction, thereby presenting an unfavorable prospect for U.S. willing- 

 ness to seek or accept international control. As the bill was finally 

 passed by the Congress, the emphasis on civilian control may have 

 helped avoid such an impression. Moreover, the law marked an un- 

 precedented intrusion of the Federal Government into private enter- 

 prise through its provisions for Government ownership and control 

 over fissionable materials and provisions for various licensing powers 

 with respect to facilities and activities. Thus, by these provisions the 

 Congress demonstrated its awareness of the unprecedented importance 

 and dangers of the development of atomic energy. The section on 

 international control may have served to show a positive U.S. view 

 toward international control and preparedness to implement it. 



However, the considerable precautions which were taken regarding 

 release of information may have served to reflect a U.S. desire to retain 

 its atomic monopoly. Although these precautions were also based on 

 U.S. security considerations and on U.S. suspicions of how other coun- 

 tries might use atomic weapons once they had acquired them, nonethe- 

 less, the debate on this issue and the resulting provisions in the law may 

 have inspired doubts in other countries as to the sincerity of U.S. 

 pledges to relinquish its monopoly to an appropriate international au- 

 thority. In any case, the following conclusion of a State Department 

 publication seems applicable: 



The evolution of a policy for domestic control not only pro- 

 vided parallels for the problems that were certain to be met 

 in international planning, but it illustrated as no other 

 process could the magnitude and complexity of the task that 

 awaited inter-Governmental collaboration. 12 



HASTY DEMOBILIZATION OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES 



A relevant consideration in the evolution of early U.S. policy for 

 the atom is the overall state of the U.S. defense posture in 1945 and 

 1946. 13 With the advent of peace, the American public and the troops 

 themselves clamored to bring the armies home, on the grounds that 

 there was no longer a need to maintain the wartime level of military 

 manpower. Besides being influenced by the euphoric atmosphere 

 brought on by the end of war, many people looked to the newly de- 

 veloped atomic bomb as a sufficient source of military strength. A 

 week after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945. 

 President Truman responded to public and congressional pressure, 

 and announced that inductions would drop from 80,000 to 50,000 per 

 month and that within 12 to 18 months, 5i/ 2 million men would be 

 released from the service. By April 1946, the number of those dis- 

 charged from the Army had reached nearly 7 million. By June 30, 

 1946, out of a total of about 3 million military personnel remaining on 



12 State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 21. 



"The following discussion is based primarily on Lieberman. The Scorpion and the 

 Tarantula, pp. 227-234. 



